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Abstract 
 
  When people invest in mutual funds, they invest in talents of 
portfolio management. They obtain return from mutual funds’ active 
strategies and pay for the service of their investment advisor at the 
same time. This paper aims to evaluate the mutual fund performance 
and advisory fees in China to shed light on the answer to the question 
of whether it is rational to invest in mutual funds in China. 
 
  This paper investigates the performance and advisory fees of 55 
Chinese equity mutual funds during the period 2005-2007. The 
findings of the empirical test seem not in favor of mutual fund industry 
in China. First, the result of Jensen’s alpha denies the ability of mutual 
fund managers to beat the passive investment strategy. This may also 
be interpreted as the capital market in China is efficient. Second, based 
on the analysis of economies of scale, managers may overcharge 
advisory fees. In other words, shareholders pay a premium for conflicts 
of interest in China. Third, in the regression of returns and advisory 
fees, there is no relation between them. Performance and expense of 
managed skills in mutual funds are unrelated. 
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Chapter 1 
Introduction 
 
Mutual funds, which are also known as open-end funds, are financial 
intermediaries that allow a group of investors to pool their money 
together with a predetermined investment objective. Although they are 
rapidly developed around the world, their performance and fees are 
long being discussed. This chapter begins with an overview to show the 
background and basic concepts of mutual funds. Research questions 
and the structure of this paper will then be outlined. 
 
1.1 An overview of mutual funds 
Historically, mutual funds were evolved from closed-end funds. 
Gradually, their unique characteristics emerged and they become more 
and more popular around the world. 
1.1.1 History of mutual funds 
Prior to the eighteenth century, a number of investment vehicles 
were created and integrated individual interests in a pool of financial 
and non-financial assets. While these securities, for example tontines 
and plantation loans, were not identical to modern mutual funds, they 
demonstrated many of the same characteristics (Rouwenhorst, 2004). 
Their development created the idea of tradable ownership of a financial 
securities portfolio. In 1774, an Amsterdam merchant Abraham van 
Ketwich invited subscriptions to establish an investment trust 
(Negotiatie) named Eendragt Maakt Magt (translated Unity Creates 
Strength). Subscription was open to the public until all 2,000 shares 
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were placed; thereafter participation in the fund would only be possible 
by purchasing shares from existing shareholders in the open market. 
Following the 1772-1773 financial crisis, it aimed to provide 
diversification at low cost to small investors (Rouwenhorst, 2004). 
Based on this feature, it may be classified as a closed-end fund. 
According to Berghuis (1967), it is considered the first “mutual fund.” 
 
Gradually, this kind of organization took root in England and 
Scotland. The enactment of two British laws, the Joint Stock 
Companies Acts of 1862 and 1867, permitted investors to share in the 
profits of an investment enterprise and limited investor liability to the 
amount of investment capital devoted to the enterprise. Shortly 
thereafter, the first investment trust in England, Foreign and colonial 
Government Trust, was founded in London in 1868. According to its 
prospectus, the goal was to provide “the investor of moderate means 
the same advantages as the large capitalist in diminishing the risk of 
investing in foreign and colonial government stocks, by spreading the 
investment over a number of different stocks.” This idea of pooling 
resources and spreading risk using closed-end investments was then 
passed to the United States when the Scottish American Investment 
Trust was founded. At that time, most of the investment trusts were 
closed-end funds, which issued a fixed number of shares (Rouwenhorst, 
2004). 
 
  This changed on March 21st, 1924 when Massachusetts Investors 
Trust was launched in Boston. It is the first official mutual fund with an 
open-end financing, issuing redeemable securities. Over the past few 
decades, mutual funds had become the primary investment for small 
investors. The global growth of mutual funds was fuelled by the 
increasing globalization of finance and expanding presence of large 
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multinational financial groups in a large number of countries and by the 
strong performance of equity and bond markets.  
 
Nowadays, the explosive growth of mutual funds is one of the most 
interesting financial phenomena. This was particularly true in the 
United States where total net assets of mutual funds grew from USD 
1.6 trillion in 1992 to 10.4 trillion in 2006, equivalent to an average 
annual rate of growth of 14.6% (ICI, 2007). It was also true of most 
other countries. At the beginning of 2007, there were more than 61 
thousand mutual funds with total net asset of over 21 trillion dollars 
around the world. It is also shown that the proportion of US households 
owning mutual funds grew from 6% in 1980 to 37.1% in 1996 and 
54.9% in 2006 (ICI, 2007). Needless to say, mutual funds have become 
the strongest market tools on the U.S. market and the most attractive 
financial intermediaries around the world. 
1.1.2 Unique characteristics of mutual funds 
The mutual fund is one of different types of investment companies. 
An investment company is a corporation, trust, or partnership that 
invests pooled shareholders’ money in securities according to its 
shareholders' investment objective. The main types of investment 
companies are: mutual, or "open-end," funds, closed-end funds, unit 
investment trusts, and exchange-traded funds. 
 
A closed-end fund issues a fixed number of shares that trade on a 
stock exchange or in the over-the-counter market. Assets of a 
closed-end fund are professionally managed in accordance with the 
fund's investment objectives and policies and may be invested in stocks, 
bonds, or other securities. As with other publicly traded securities, the 
 5
market price of closed-end fund shares fluctuates and it is determined 
by supply and demand in the marketplace. A unit investment trust 
(UIT) buys and holds a generally fixed portfolio, and issues a fixed 
number of units for sale. "Units" in the trust are sold to investors, or 
"unit holders," who receive their proportionate share of dividends or 
interest paid by the trust. Unlike other investment companies, a UIT 
has a stated date for termination. At termination, investors receive their 
proportionate share of the UIT's net assets. Another fund available to 
investors is an exchange-traded fund (ETF). ETF shares are traded 
intraday on stock exchanges at market-determined prices. As such, an 
ETF has the features of an investment company (diversified portfolio, 
professional management), but its investors must buy or sell ETF 
shares through a broker just as they would the shares of any publicly 
traded company.  
 
Likewise, mutual fund investors buy fund shares, which represent 
proportionate ownership in all the fund's securities. There is no limit on 
the number of shares issued by a mutual fund. A mutual fund is referred 
to as an "open-end" fund for three main reasons: 1) it is required to 
redeem (or buy back) outstanding shares at any time, at their current 
net asset value, which is the total market value of the fund's investment 
portfolio, minus its liabilities and divided by the number of shares 
outstanding. Therefore no premiums or discounts exist in the trading of 
mutual fund shares; 2) virtually all mutual funds continuously sell their 
shares to the public; and 3) mutual funds were not leveraged (Fink, 
2006). Moreover, mutual funds may offer other benefits and services, 
such as asset allocation programs or money market sweep accounts.  
 
  Therefore, the fact that fund shares are redeemable at net asset value 
(minus, often, a redemption fee) differentiates mutual funds from other 
 6
investment companies. Because funds issue a redeemable security, new 
sales generally are viewed as crucial to a fund’s ability to survive and 
prosper. Absent new investors, funds risk being redeemed out of 
existence as shareholders cash in their holdings. The threat of “voting 
by feet” encourages mutual funds to give positive performance 
continuously. However, it may also characterize mutual funds to be 
short-sighted. 
 
  In terms of mutual fund management, the concept of “external 
management” is nearly as universal a hallmark of the fund industry as 
redeemable shares (Freeman and Brown, 2001). The external managers, 
or the investment adviser, invest the fund's assets in accordance with its 
investment objective and policy. As a professional money manager, the 
investment adviser provides a level of money management expertise 
usually beyond the scope of the average individual investor. An 
adviser's investment decisions are based on a variety of factors, 
including the fund's investment objectives, its risk parameters, and 
extensive research of the market and financial performance of specific 
securities (e.g., the performance and risks associated with a particular 
company's securities). The allocation of a fund's assets among 
investments is constantly monitored and adjusted by the fund's 
investment adviser to protect the interests of shareholders in the fund. 
The relationship between investment adviser and mutual fund investors 
is somewhat similar to relationship between managers and shareholders 
in an open corporation (Bogle, 1999). 
 
The professional advisors and the expenses of operating the fund are 
paid by investors. There are mainly four kinds of fees charged by 
mutual funds to investors: front-end load, back-end load, 
administration fee and advisory fee. Front-end load is charged at the 
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purchase while back-end load at the selling. Administration fee is 
mainly to pay for marketing and distribution expenses, such as 
compensating sales professionals, directly from a fund's assets. The 
largest component of a fund's total operating expense usually is the 
advisory fee which is an ongoing fee charged by the fund's investment 
adviser to manage the fund and select its portfolio of securities. 
1.1.3 The development of mutual funds in China 
Although mutual funds in Hong Kong and Taiwan have a relatively 
longer history and established market, this paper focuses on mainland 
China. The same as other countries, mutual funds in china oriented 
from closed-end funds. 
 
  In 1991, the first three investment trust Zhuxin Investment Trust, 
Wuhan Security Investment Trust and Shenzhen Nanshan Risk 
Investment Trust founded as predecessors of closed-end funds. 
However, it was not until 1997 that the investment trust market was 
regulated, with the enactment of Securities Investment Funds Interim 
Measure. For the first time, the setting, founding, operating and 
management, and the responsibilities of investment service providers 
are difined. In 1998, Kaiyuan Fund and Jintai Fund are the first two 
closed-end funds in China. After that, in 2001, the first mutual fund 
Huaan Creative Investment Trust was founded. Since then, investment 
trust industry has experienced a rapid growth. In 2006, national total 
net asset value increased from RMB 55.8 trillion to 94.1 trillion by 
68.69% (CSRC, 2007). By the end of 2006, there had been 254 mutual 
funds with net asset value of 6941.41, which accounted for 81% of 
total net asset value of the investment trusts in China (SAC, 2007).  
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  According to China Securities Regulatory Commission (CSRC) 
(2007), the reasons of the explosion of mutual funds market are: 1) The 
throughout standardization and regulation of listed companies and 
securities intermediaries in organization structure and shareholders 
protection improved the quality and efficiency of the financial markets 
in China; 2) The steady and fast growing of GDP, rapid increase in 
foreign currency reserve, and appreciation expectation of RMB 
stimulated the raise of many stock prices; 3) The “profit effect”. In 
2006, mutual fund realized a yield of 121.4%, which was much higher 
than investment directly to stocks, bonds or bank deposits. Therefore, 
mutual funds became the first choice of investment tools. 
 
1.2 Research questions and outline 
Research questions and the aim of this paper will be explained in this 
part. Besides, research method and structure will be outlined. 
1.2.1 Research questions 
The aim of this dissertation is to examine whether it is worthy to 
invest in mutual funds in China. In detail, the purpose is to evaluate the 
Chinese mutual fund performance and advisory fees.  
 
The principal reason mutual funds have won acceptance in the 
marketplace has little to do with securities law requirement or the 
government regulatory know-how. Mutual funds have been well 
received mainly because they can be very good products for investment 
in the capital market. Mutual funds historically have provided their 
shareholders with the ability to pursue a considerable variety of 
different investment objectives as co-owners of an entity (Freeman and 
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Brown, 2001). They offer three main services: diversified risk, 
professional management, and a redeemable security. Although mutual 
funds have been well established in the developed countries, they are 
still at the primary stage in developing countries as China (Song, 2003). 
Until recently, mutual funds have been increasingly popular in China 
and collected funds form more and more investors. Given the mutual 
fund history and their current development in China, it can be foreseen 
that mutual funds will grow in an accelerated speed in China. 
 
However, the worthiness of investing in mutual funds may not be 
guaranteed. Making judgments to this question, one should consider 
the return and costs. The reason for investors to utilize mutual funds 
is that they provide a relatively low cost investment to achieve a 
well-diversified portfolio, with the benefits of professional 
management (Klapper et al., 2003). If professional managers fail to 
produce superior performance then the investor might be better served 
by creation of portfolios that track market indexes. Often, many mutual 
funds Investment advisors boasted that anomalies return can be 
observed by professionals and investing in them means a guarantee of 
steady return. Whether this is true has been long argued between 
standard finance and behavioral finance. On the other hand, it is the 
investors who take the risk that managers to whom they entrust their 
funds may under-perform the market on a risk-adjusted basis (Dowen 
and Mann, 2003). Investors pay for the professional mutual fund 
managers, which is the cost born by investors, and operating expenses. 
The fees are compensations for the effort of professional mutual fund 
managers who gain the return for investors. But whether these fees 
match their performance and how they are determined need to be 
investigated. Ideally, efficient managers should be able to operate a 
fund at a lower cost. 
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Therefore, the question of whether mutual funds are reasonably 
operating in China may be able to be divided into three sub-questions: 
1) Did mutual funds advisors’ professional management work? Or Did 
mutual funds perform well enough to “beat the market?” 2) Are fees 
overcharged by mutual funds? Or is there a premium pay for the 
conflict of interests between shareholders and managers in mutual fund 
industry? 3) What is the relation between costs and the return of 
professional management? Or are advisory fees reasonably matching 
their counterpart performance in mutual fund industry? These questions 
have been long discussed in academic arena and among practitioners.  
 
This paper sheds light on the above questions and tries to present a 
decent empirical test to evaluate the mutual fund performance and 
advisory fees in China. Although some issues have been long discussed 
and analyzed in countries with well developed capital market, for 
example the U.K. and the U.S., there is rare work towards them in 
China. Most existing empirical tests are based on Chinese closed-end 
funds, which have a relatively longer history than their cousin of 
mutual funds in China. It is worth analyzing the emerging, fast growing 
and somewhat under-regulated China mutual fund industry. 
1.2.2 Research methods 
  In order to answer the three research questions, quantitative research 
method is conducted. For mutual fund performance, Jensen’s (1989) 
alpha will be used as the measurement. Based on the Capital Asset 
Pricing Model, Jensen’s alpha is a value indicating excess return in the 
market compare with efficient portfolio investment. An index will be 
chosen as the benchmark to proxy a market portfolio. In other words, 
active managed mutual funds will be compared with passive index 
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investment in China by regressing them in the formula of Jensen’s 
alpha. A positive alpha suggests a positive management skills and 
out-performance. In terms of advisory fees, mutual funds will be group 
by their size to see whether fee ratio decrease as size grows. If so, 
advisors are passing the benefit of economies of scale to shareholders 
and overcharging will be less an issue. Concerning on the relation 
between return and advice expenses, a regression will be conducted. If 
the coefficients are significant, there exists a relationship. 
1.2.3 Structure 
  In this paper, literature review will be presented to show the 
underpinning theories and related works on similar issues in Chapter 2. 
Chapter 3 then show methodology and data employed in the test. After 
that, research questions will be analyzed and discussed through 
empirical tests in chapter 4. Reasons of the results and limitations of 
the research will be briefly indicated in this chapter as well. Finally, 
Chapter 5 concludes the entire research and summarizes the answers to 
research questions. 
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Chapter 2 
Literature Review 
 
  In order to answer the research questions, important issues, such as 
measurements of mutual fund performance, implications of actively 
portfolio management skills, or problems in advisory fees, should be 
discuss. Before data analyses, underpinnings of this paper will be 
reviewed. In this chapter, theory of Capital Asset Pricing Model and 
efficient market hypothesis will be displayed and discussed. After that, 
literatures on performance and advisory fees will be presented.  
 
2.1 Capital Asset Pricing Model 
Before the birth of Capital Asset Pricing Model (CAPM), there is no 
certain measurement of rate of return. Fisher and Lorie (1964), who 
studies the return on the stocks listed on the New York Stock Exchange, 
states that: “It is surprising to realize that there have been no 
measurements of the rates of return on investments in common stocks 
that could be considered accurate and definitive (p3).”  
2.1.1 The logic of CAPM 
  The notion that diversification reduces risk is not novel. According 
to Herbison (2003), the proverb “Do not keep all your eggs in one 
basket” appeared as far back as Torriano’s (1666) Common Palce of 
Italian Proverbs. Half a century ago, Harry Markowitz (1952) had the 
insight that, because of broad economic influences, risks across assets 
were to some extent correlated. As a result, investors could eliminate 
some (but not all) risk by holding a diversified portfolio. The CAPM 
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builds on the model of portfolio choice developed by him.  
 
In Markowitz's (1959) model, an investor selects a portfolio at time 
t-1 that produces a stochastic return at t. The model assumes investors 
are risk averse and, when choosing among portfolios, they care only 
about the return and variance of their one-period investment return. 
Therefore, investors choose "minimum-variance efficient" portfolios, 
which 1) minimize the variance of portfolio return for a given expected 
return, and 2) maximize expected return for a given variance. Thus, the 
portfolio chosen according to Markowitz approach is often referred to 
as a "Markowitz portfolio." 
 
To obtain a Markowitz (1959) portfolio, the first step is to identify 
the risk-return opportunities available to investors. In Figure 1, all risky 
assets available on the market lie within the minimum variance frontier.  
 
Figure 1 
Minimum-variance frontier 
 
The horizontal axis shows portfolio risk, measured by the standard 
deviation (σ) of portfolio return; The vertical axis shows expected 
return. It is clear that individual assets which constitute the minimum 
Expected Return
Efficient
frontier 
Minimum
 
variance 
portfolio Minimum 
variance 
frontier 
Individual 
assets 
σ 
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variance frontier have the lowest variance (standard deviation) for a 
given return. The frontier is divided into upper and lower frontier by 
the minimum variance portfolio. For any portfolio on the lower portion, 
there is a portfolio with a greater expected return and the same variance. 
Therefore, the upper frontier, or efficient frontier, is the line for 
“Markowitz portfolios”.  
   
Based on the Markowitz portfolio selection model, Sharpe (1964) 
and Lintner (1965) add a very important assumption and finally give 
birth to CAPM. The assumption is that there is borrowing and lending 
at a risk-free rate, which is the same for all investors and does not 
depend on the amount borrowed or lent. Figure 2 describes the 
emergence of CAPM.  
 
Figure 2  
Investment Opportunities 
 
 
The ATP curve is the efficient frontier as illustrated in Figure 1. 
Adding risk-free borrowing and lending turns the efficient plots into a 
straight line. As a result, there are three investment behaviours in the 
market: 1) only risk-free securities (point Rf); 2) only risky securities 
(Markowitz efficient frontier ATP); and 3) combination of risk-free and 
E(r)
Rf
A
g
T
P
σ 
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risky securities (the straight line between Rf and g). To sum up, 
portfolios which combine risk-free lending or borrowing with some 
risky portfolio g plot along a straight line from Rf through g in Figure 2 
(Fama and French, 2004). 
 
To obtain the minimum-variance-efficient portfolios available with 
risk-free borrowing and lending, one ratchet up a line from Rf in Figure 
2 by selecting different portfolios until reaching the portfolio T, which 
is the tangency point of a line from Rf to the efficient frontier. By doing 
this, according to Tobin’s (1958) “separation theorem”, the most 
outstanding result is that a portfolio manager will offer the same risky 
portfolio, T, to all investors regardless of their degree of risk aversion. 
   
The line of the CAPM is now emerged. All efficient portfolios are 
combinations of the risk-free asset, either risk-free borrowing or 
lending, and a single risky tangency portfolio, T. Since all investors 
hold the same portfolio T of risky assets, it must be the value-weight 
market portfolio of risky assets. Specifically, each risky asset's weight 
in the tangency portfolio, which we now call M (for the "market"), 
must be the total market value of outstanding units of the asset divided 
by the total market value of all risky assets (Bodie, et al., 2005). 
 
  Based on the RfT line in Figure 2, Sharpe-Lintner CAPM can be 
summarized as: 
   E(Ri) = E(Rf) +βim [E(RM) – E(Rf)], (
( )
( )M
Mi
im R
RR
2
,cov
σ
β = ),     ① 
where E(Ri) denotes to the expected return on asset i; E(Rf) is the 
expected retrun on risk-free assets whose market betas equal to zero, 
which means the retrun of this kind is not correlated with the expected 
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market return, E(RM). βim is the market beta of asset i. βim is the 
covariance of the asset’s return with the market return divided by the 
variance of the market return. Therefore, the second term is a risk 
premium – the market beta of asset i, βim times the return per unit of 
beta, which is the expected market return E(RM), minus risk-free rate of 
return, E(Rf). Since βim is the slope in the regression of asset i’s return 
on the market return, it can be seen as the sensitivity of the asset’s 
return on variation in the market return (Fama and French, 2004).  
2.1.2 Implications for mutual funds 
Jensen’s alpha 
  Jensen’s alpha is one of the most famous measurements of mutual 
fund performance. It is derived directly from the security market line 
(SML) in the CAPM theorem. The SML graphically portrayed 
expected return-beta relationship in CAPM as in Figure 3. “Fairly 
priced” assets plot exactly on the SML, where there expected returns 
are matched with their risk (Jensen, 1969). The slope of SML is the risk 
premium of the market portfolio since the market beta is 1.  
 
Figure 3  
Security market line 
 
E(r) 
Rf 
M
SML 
β
α
E(RM) 
1
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Hence, the SML relation is a benchmark to assess the fair expected 
return on a risky asset or portfolio. If a portfolio is a good investment, 
it will provide an expected return in excess of the fair return over plots 
on SML. Thus underpriced stocks locate above the SML because their 
expected returns are greater than dictated by CAPM in the same level 
of risk, β. On the other hand, if the portfolio is a bad investment, its 
rate of return will locate under the SML. 
 
The difference between the CAPM and actual rates of return on a 
stock is called the stock’s alpha, or Jensen’s alpha, as illustrated in 
Figure 3. Reflected in the calculation of rate of return for an 
underpriced stock, CAPM equation ① need to be adjusted as: 
E(Ri) = α + E(Rf) +βim [E(RM) – E(Rf)]             ② 
The performance of a mutual fund, reflected by its rate of return, can 
be measured by the value of α in the equation ②. Equation ② indicates 
that the starting point of portfolio management may be a passive 
market-index portfolio where α = 0 (plots on SML). If α > 0, the 
mutual fund portfolio is better than a market-index portfolio, while if α 
< 0, the mutual fund portfolio is worse. The mutual fund manager 
selects as many stocks with positive Jensen’s alpha as possible. 
 
Economies of scale 
  The logic of CAPM, especially Tobin’s (1958) “separation theorem”, 
implies that the mutual fund investment advisory’s portfolio selection 
may be separated into two independent tasks. The first task is to 
identify the optimal risky portfolio, while the second task is to allocate 
the complete portfolio to risk-free versus the risky portfolio (Bodie, et. 
al, 2005). It is noticeable that the best risky portfolio provided by the 
investment advisor, located at T in Figure 2 is the same for all clients. 
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One mutual fund can serve any number of clients with small 
incremental costs. The economies of scale makes professional 
management more efficient and hence less costly. 
 
  However, different mutual fund advisors will employ different 
method to derive efficient frontiers and provide different “best” 
portfolios to their investors. The differences may caused by the security 
analysis. If the quality of security analysis is poor, a passive portfolio 
such as a market index fund will result in a better portfolio than an 
active portfolio that uses low-quality security analysis to invest in the 
seemingly mispriced securities. Nonetheless, the implication that 
limited number of portfolios may be sufficient to serve the demands of 
a wide range of investors is the theoretical basis of mutual fund 
industry (Bodie, et al., 2005).  
 
  Furthermore, according to, the sophisticated security selection gives 
three reasons to invest in mutual funds (Bodie, et al., 2005). First, the 
demand for sophisticated investment management has increased 
enormously due to greater need and ability to save money. Second, 
amateur investors’ ability can not settle the complicated investment of 
the widening spectrum of financial markets and financial instruments. 
Finally, there are economies of scale in investment analysis as 
mentioned above.  
 
2.2 Capital market efficiency 
  Historically, the issue of mutual fund performance is tied with the 
test of capital market efficiency. Whether mutual fund mangers can 
beat the market has long been the traditional and fierce battlefield 
between standard finance and behavioral finance (Statman, 1999). 
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According to Mickiel (2003), it might be the strongest proof for 
efficient market hypothesis that mutual fund managers fail to 
outperform the market. 
2.2.1 Random walks and efficient market hypothesis 
  The efficient market hypothesis (EMH) is known as an economic 
phenomenon that stock prices already reflect all information on the 
market. It is associated with the notion of random walks.  
 
Random walks in the market suggest that there is no correlation 
between stock prices of different periods. Any news indicating an 
underpriced stock and offers a profit opportunity will be immediately 
reflected on the raising of stock price. Because investors will rash to 
buy the stock and this immediately bid up its price to a fair level (Bodie, 
et al., 2005).  Under the notion that news is unpredictable, price 
changes must be unpredictable and random (Malkiel, 2003). As a result, 
prices fully reflect all information and even uninformed investors 
throwing darts at the Wall Street Journal could select a portfolio that 
would obtain the rate of return as well as experts (Malkiel, 1973). 
 
  According to Fama (1970), there are three versions of the EMH: the 
weak, semi-strong and strong forms. The weak-form hypothesis denies 
the technical analysis, which is the analysis of past stock prices in an 
attempt to predict future prices. Stock prices already reflect all 
information of market trading data, for example historical prices. The 
semi-strong-form hypothesis further denies publicly available 
information analysis, which is the study of public information about 
prospects of firms, for example balance sheet. All public information 
must be reflected in the stock price. Finally, in the strong-form 
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hypothesis, not only public information but also private information 
available only to insiders is reflected in the stock price. Both technical 
analysis and fundamental analysis are denied completely. It is a too 
extreme version of EMH in that insider trades are forbidden in most 
capital markets. 
2.2.2 Efficient market hypothesis versus behavioral 
finance 
  Market efficiency is at the centre of standard finance versus 
behavioral finance for years. Standard finance confirms EMH based on 
the assumption that investors are rational. Behavioral finance, on the 
other hand, points out that EMH ignores the mental differences and 
cognitive errors in their decision-making and information processing. 
Behavioral finance lists some irrational behaviors based on psychology, 
in the attack on EMH. For example: 
 
1. Frames: decisions may be affected by how choices are framed. For 
example, Kahneman and Tversky’s (1979) prospect theory shows 
that individual may be risk-averse in terms of gains but risk-seeking 
in terms of losses. One of the most obvious frames is mental 
accounting. Although efficient frontier can only be achieved when 
investors consider covariance and integrate all investment choices 
into an overall portfolio (Markowitz, 1959), but, in fact, people 
often keep their portfolio money in separated mental accounts, such 
as retirement account, education account, or travel account.  
2. Overconfidence: people may be overconfidence on their ability 
and rely too much on their experience. Barber and Odean (2000, 
2001) point out that men are more confidence than women in that 
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they invest more frequently. They find that these high trading 
activities have a higher chance of poor performance. 
3. Regret avoidance: the pain when the outcome of a decision turns 
out to be worse than other alternative choices that would have been 
made. Regret avoidance hampers the investment on underpriced 
stocks, because investors may be more risk-averse towards stocks 
with recent poor performance and discount their cash flow at a 
higher rate.  
 
Therefore, people under EMH are rational whereas people under 
behavioral finance are “normal” (Statman, 1999). Haugen (2001) 
confirms some payoffs rooted in the purely irrational human behavior 
by looking forward to the field of psychology, which evidently shows 
advantages of behavioral finance in real world investing. 
 
In the book “the inefficient stock market: what pays off and why”, 
Haugen (2001) clarifies that the cross-section of stock returns is highly 
predictable and the premium is associated with long-term price 
corrections in an over-reactive market. From his point of view, 
capitalization-weighted market indices, dominated by large growth 
stocks are unlikely to be efficient investments. And CAPM is no longer 
appropriate for predicting expected returns on stocks, which should be 
by replaced by more powerful, empirically based forecasting models, 
for example factor model, to calculate the cost of capital. In addition, 
the biases in pricing by the market exhibit sufficiently that they should 
play a leading role in decisions relating to the finance of the firm and 
assets securitization.  
 
  Haugen’s (2001) idea represents one of the key arguments of the 
behavioral finance against EMH that investors can earn above-average 
 22
returns without accepting above-average risks. Such excess returns are 
called anomalies returns. If there are patterns which enable investors to 
earn anomalies returns, capital market will not be efficient.   
 
Some empirical tests show that some momentum may exist in 
short-run stock prices, which means that “technical analysis” can be 
used to discover trends of stock price movement  (Lo and MacKinlay, 
1999; Lo, Mamaysky and Wang, 2000). Economists of behavioral 
finance contribute such momentum to the “bandwagon effect” and the 
under reaction to new information, which make the full impact of news 
realized over a period of time but not immediately. In contrast, EMH 
insists that stock market has no memory. Fama (1998) finds that 
underreaction are as frequent as overreaction, and the existence of 
anomalies returns are far from clear among different measurement 
models. Meanwhile, Odean (1999) show that momentum strategies are 
not profitable because of transactions costs involved in execution. 
 
In terms of predictable patterns based on firm characteristics and 
valuation parameters, Fama and French (1993) suggest that size and 
price-to-book-value together provide explanatory power for future 
returns. They investigated data from 1963 to 1990 and found that 
smaller-company stocks have higher average returns that 
large-company stocks. Besides, they also found that low 
price-to-book-value is a pattern of so-call “value” stocks compared 
with overpaid “growth” stocks. These patterns may be referred to as a 
proof of market inefficiency. At the same time, however, one may also 
conclude that Fama and French’s (1993) three factor model (including 
size and price-to-book-value as parameters of risk), but not CAPM, is 
the appropriate model to capture the relation between risk and return. 
Furthermore, Malkiel (2003) extended the time horizon of their 
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research back to 1930s and found that the mutual funds who 
specializing in “value” stocks did not realize higher returns. Hence, the 
findings of Fama and French (1993) may be a result of data mining. 
 
Confronted with behavioral finance theories, claiming that the future 
stock process are somewhat predictable on the basis of past stock price 
patterns and certain fundamental valuation metrics, EMH insists that 
the financial markets are efficient enough to eliminate any so called 
anomalies returns. Without denying the occasionally imperfect market 
pricing, the influence of psychological factors on securities prices and 
the substantial volatility, Malkiel (2003) points out that although the 
stock market in the short run may be a voting mechanism, in the long 
run it is a weighing mechanism.  
2.2.3 Active versus passive portfolio management 
Perhaps the performance of professionals can be considered as the 
strongest proof of whether EMH is true (Malkiel, 2003). If there were 
patterns to earn anomalies returns, mutual fund manager with active 
portfolio management should be able to beat the market. Otherwise, a 
passive or buy-and-hold strategy will be the best policy and the active 
management would be a waste of effort as stated in EMH.  
 
It is easy to imagine that any easy-to-operate technical analysis or 
fundamental analysis will be used wildly enough so that information 
obtained will be reflected in stock prices. As a result, easily observed or 
published anomalies returns tend to self-destroy quickly (Schwert, 
2001). For example the so-call “January effect”, in which stock prices 
rose in early January (Haugen and Lakonishok, 1988) and “Monday 
returns”, in which higher stock returns around holidays (Ariel, 1990) 
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disappeared as soon as they are discovered. Thus, only uncommon 
techniques and serious management may be able to profit from 
investment. These techniques of portfolio selection and market timing 
may only belong to managers of large portfolios, who has specialized 
in these and have a strong incentive to earn excess returns. Only a 
small percentage of excess rate of return will generate a substantial 
amount of profits. Small investors may be better off by putting their 
money under the management of large active managed portfolios. 
Active managed mutual fund portfolios pool resources from small 
investors. In this way, small investors share professional insights and 
economies of scale in return. 
 
However, EMH advocates the passive investment strategy, or buy 
and hold strategy, which makes no effort on security analysis. A passive 
strategy only focus on a well-diversified portfolio of securities but not 
buying underpriced and selling overpriced stocks, because stock prices 
are “fair” enough. Frequent buying and selling may just result in a 
waste of large brokerage fees without improvement in performance 
(Barber and Odean, 2000). An index is often seen as a proxy of market 
portfolio. So the return of passive strategy is often measured by the 
return on a market index, for example S&P500.  
 
Therefore, the comparison between active and passive portfolio 
management can be reflected by the performance of active managed 
mutual funds and the index return. If the anomalies returns exist in the 
performance of active strategy, such mutual funds beat the market. At 
the same time, behavioral finance beat EMH. The literature review of 
mutual fund performance and expenses will be presented in the 
following parts. 
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2.3 Performance 
  The performance of active management has been a debate for many 
years. The empirical researchers have different answers to the question 
whether active managed mutual funds can out-perform market indices. 
Meanwhile, they employed different methodologies to evaluate mutual 
fund performance in their tests. The measurement models and 
empirical literature will be presented. 
2.3.1 Mutual fund performance models 
  Basically, the models measuring mutual fund performance can be 
divided into unconditional models and conditional models. 
Unconditional models 
The model used to measure the risk-adjusted performance of mutual 
funds is based on CAPM. Jensen’s (1968) alpha in equation ② above 
can be seen as a reprehensive of unconditional models. The value of 
Jensen’s alpha is often interpreted as a measure of out- or 
under-performance relative to the market index. Here the equation ② is 
presented as: 
               Rit - Rft = αi + βi (RMt – Rft) + εit            ③ 
where Rit denotes to the return on fund i in month t, Rft is the risk-free 
rate of return in month t and RMt the return on the benchmark index. 
 
 Based on the single model above, Fama and French (1993) developed 
a three-factor model, adding size and price-to-book-value as 
parameters as: 
 
Rit – Rft = αi + β0i (Rmt – Rft) +β1i SMBt +β2i HMLt + εit 
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where SMBt is the difference in return between a small portfolio and a 
large portfolio at time t and HMLt is the difference in return between a 
portfolio of high price-to-book-value stocks and that of low 
price-to-book-value stocks at time t. After that, Carhart (1997) add a 
fourth factor in order to capture the momentum anomaly. Furthermore, 
a bond index is included in the measurement of mutual fund 
performance, because risk-free rate may not represent some high 
yielding and risky bonds included in the mutual fund investment (Elton 
et al., 1993; Elton and Gruber, 1999). Thereafter, the performance 
model develops as: 
 
Rit – Rft = αi + β0i (Rmt – Rft) +β1i SMBt +β2i HMLt + β3i PR1YRt                  
+ β4i (Rbt - Rft) +εit 
 
where PR1YRt is the difference in return between a portfolio of past 
winners and that of past losers at time t; Rbt is the return on a 
government bond index at time t. 
 
Conditional models 
Unconditional models assume that both the investor and manager do 
not consider the state of the economy. In this case, a portfolio’s beta 
remains the same through time. As a result, unconditional models may 
be fault in estimating mutual fund performance. Concerning on this 
issue, beta is adjusted to obtain a time-varying returns. Based on 
models developed by Ferson and Schadt (1996), I simplified a 
conditional model as the following: 
 
Rit - Rft = αi + (βi0 + ∆βit) (RMt – Rft) + εit 
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where ∆βit is a parameter of adjustment for beta, which is a 
predetermined valuable and changes with respect to the market 
condition at time t. The principle of equation above can easily be 
applied to other unconditional models to obtain a conditional one. 
2.3.2 Empirical literature on mutual fund performance 
  In addition to models above, there are a variety of measurement tools 
for mutual fund performance. For decades, researchers have produced a 
large amount of works on mutual fund performance. However, I do not 
try to give a comprehensive review. Instead, some representatives in 
the analyses and empirical tests of mutual fund performance are 
presented. The selected literatures also give guidance and proofs to this 
research. Their methodologies and findings will be presented in time 
sequence. 
 
Sharpe, W F, 1966, “Mutual fund performance,” The Journal of 
Business, Vol. 39, pp. 119-138. 
 
  William Sharpe (1966) is one of the earliest researchers on mutual 
fund performance. His work is based on Markowitz’s (1952) “portfolio 
theory”, Fama’s (1965) “behavior of stock-market prices”, and 
Treynor’s (1965) “Treynor Index”.  
 
  Consider a portfolio investment between risky and risk-free 
securities, Sharpe describs the CAPM relation of risk and return as: 
σ
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where fR  is the risk-free rate, iσ  the portfolio i’s associated risk, 
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and (Ei - fR / iσ ) is the risk premium. The optimal portfolio will be 
the one with the greatest reward-to-variability ratio, which is known as 
the Sharpe ratio today: 
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  To test this ratio, Sharpe examines 34 mutual funs from 1954-1963. 
The results of his test vary from 0.43 to 0.78. For EMH, the reason may 
be either transitory or due to excessive expenditure by the funds. 
Otherwise, this may be attributed to management skills. 
 
Treynor, J and Mazury, K (1966), ‘Can mutual funds outguess the 
market?’ Harvard Business Review, July, 131-136. 
 
  Treynor and Mazury discuss the popular idea among investors that 
fund managers are able to anticipate market movement, and the 
dilemma of whether or not managers should attempt to market time. 
They test mutual fund historical success in anticipating major moves in 
the market. They explain that the only way a fund can translate ability 
to outperform the market is to vary the fund’s volatility systematically 
in a manner that results in an upwardly concave line. There are 57 
funds from 1953 to 1962 in their sample to investigate whether the 
volatility of a fund is higher in years when the market does well than 
when the market does poorly. They compute a characteristic line 
wherein the rate of return for a managed fund is plotted against the rate 
of return for a suitable market index. There is no evidence of curvature 
in lines for any of mutual funds in the sample. They conclude that none 
of managers outperform the market and it is not the responsibility of 
managers in failing to forecast market changes. 
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Jensen, M C (1968), ‘The performance of mutual funds in the period 
1945-1964’, The Journal of Finance, Vol. 23, pp. 389-416. 
 
  This is the first work to measure the mutual fund performance using 
a model which compares a fund’s performance with a benchmark. 
Recall equation ③, Jensen’s model is a practical adaptation of CAPM. 
He use 115 mutual funds spanning 1945-1964 and returns for S&P 500 
index to proxy the market. The result shows that only 39 funds have a 
positive α. Jensen further test the statistical significance of α and 
reports that 14 funds have a t-value less than -2 while only three funds 
have performance that are significantly positive at the 5% critical value. 
Hence, he concludes that mutual funds do not perform better than mere 
random chance. 
 
McDonald, J (1974), ‘Objective and performance of mutual funds, 
1960-1969’, Journal of Financial and Quantitative Analysis, Vol. 9-3, 
pp. 311-333. 
 
  The aim of this work is to evaluate the objectives, risk and return of 
123 American mutual funds using monthly data with the time horizon 
of 1960-1969. McDonald considers five questions: (1) how are stated 
fund objectives related to risk and return? (2) How do funds of 
differing objectives perform in terms of return and return-to-risk 
measures? (3) Do average excess returns increase with risk? (4) How 
does the risk-adjusted performance of the average fund compare to that 
of the overall market? And (5) Do funds at one end of the risk spectrum 
outperform those at the other end? 
 
  The author obtains the systematic risk of each fund by regressing 
monthly excess returns on market excess returns. Mutual funds are 
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divided into six groups. Initial objectives are found to be positively 
related to beta. Moreover, more aggressive portfolios appear to 
outperform lesser aggressive ones. In the analysis of mutual fund 
performance, Jensen’s (1968) alpha is used as a measurement. 
McDonald concludes that mutual funds as a whole do not significantly 
perform differently than the market. 
 
Lehmann, B and Modest D (1987), ‘Mutual fund performance 
evaluation: a comparison of benchmarks and benchmark comparisons’, 
The Journal of Finance, Vol. 42, 233-265. 
 
  In this paper the authors provide empirical evidence on whether the 
selection of benchmarks affects the measurement of performance. 
Based on Jensen’s (1968) alpha, Lehmann and Modest introduce a 
market time ability: 
Rit - Rft = αi + βi (RMt – Rft) + βi (RMt – Rft)2 + εit 
  The authors include two benchmarks. One is for CAPM and the 
other for APT. They find that Jensen’s alphas are sensitive to the choice 
of APT benchmarks, while insensitive to the number of factors. It is 
concluded that the choice of benchmark portfolio may significantly 
impact performance results. 
 
Grinblatt, M and Titman, T (1989), ‘Mutual fund performance: an 
analysis of quarterly portfolio holdings’, The Journal of Business, Vol. 
62, pp. 393-416. 
 
Consider transaction cost and fees of mutual funds, Grinblatt and 
Titman employ both actual returns and gross portfolio returns of funds 
to compare performance of active and passive management, which is 
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different from previous researchers who examine the actual returns 
realized by mutual fund investors. They use a quarterly data from 1975 
to 1984 and calculate Jensen’s alpha against four benchmark portfolios: 
(1) the monthly rebalanced equally-weighted portfolios of all listed 
CRSP securities, (2) the CRSP value-weighted index, (3) ten-factor 
portfolios, and (4) an eight-portfolio benchmark based on firm size, 
yield and past returns.  
 
Their findings include: (1) Survivorship bias is larger for smaller 
funds to some extent. (2) Transactions costs are inversely related to the 
funds’ size. (3) Abnormal gross return performance is inversely related 
to fund size. (4) Excess returns do not exist in actual returns. The 
authors conclude that although out-performance may exist among 
growth, aggressive, smaller funds, these funds have the highest 
expenses, thereby eliminating abnormal investor returns. Therefore, 
investors can not benefit from mutual fund managers’ skills. 
 
Liu, H, Li, B, Zhao, Y, Xiong, Q and Lin, X (2001), ‘Evaluation on 
investment ability of equity fund managers and their performance in 
China’, China Securities, 24th August. 
 
  The authors investigate fourteen equity funds with time horizon from 
1999 to 2001 to evaluate the ability of fund manager and performance. 
In terms of measurement, they employ Jensen’s (1968) alpha, Treynor 
and Mazury’s (1966) portfolio selection and market timing estimator, 
and Fama’s (1972) “components of investment performance”. Although 
the sample is close-end funds but not mutual funds due to the limited 
history of mutual funds in China (Tu and Zhang, 2004), this work 
sheds light on the security market environment for investment trust in 
China and paves the way for mutual fund performance analysis years 
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later. In addition, the authors point out problems hampering the fund 
performance improvement in the fund industry, some of which still 
exist till now. 
 
  The authors conclude that the ability of fund managers is not 
significant. They contribute this to: (1) Immature security market; (2) 
Lack of investment channels; (3) poor quality of listed companies; (4) 
high transition costs.  
 
2.4 Advisory Fees 
   Investors not only take the risk that the managers may 
underperform the market, but also the agency cost. As discussed above, 
it is believed that economies of scale lower the mutual fund expense. 
Besides, an efficient manager should be able to operate a fund at a 
lower cost (Dowen and Mann, 2004). Whether advisory fees are 
overcharged and their relation with performance is very important to 
evaluate the benefit of investing in mutual funds. 
2.4.1 Conflicts of interest 
  Jensen and Meckling (1976) suggest that there is an agency problem 
in organizations characterized by separation of “ownership” and 
“control”. In the process of public issuing, the ownership of the 
organization is diffused and individual shareholders acting as principles 
only claim for a very small fraction of the ownership respectively. So 
their individual counterpart power on the organization as very weak. 
More often than not, individual shareholders diversified their 
investments and have little interest in monitoring a specific portfolio. 
But they still ask for better service for their investment, and returns for 
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the risk they bear. On the other hand, managers acting as agents, who 
manage shareholders’ funds, may have their own interests. They are 
more interested in their own wealth instead of shareholders’, such as 
higher fixed salaries, personal expenditure, or reputation. The conflicts 
of interest between mangers and shareholders may give incentives to 
mangers to act opportunistic. Managers may obtain interest of their 
own at the cost of shareholders, which is the root of the agency cost 
(Fama and Jensen, 1980a). 
 
The fund manager, or external investment advisory, can be seen as 
an agent while shareholders, or investors, of the mutual fund can be 
seen as principles. The fund manager pool money from shareholders, 
who are the actual owners, and decide the way mutual funds invest. 
Therefore, the structure of a mutual fund management may give rise to 
conflicts of interest between the manager and investors and leads to an 
agency problem (Freeman and Brown, 2001). Specifically in the focus 
of this paper, managers act opportunistically in charging advisory fees 
which is their salary.  
 
As discussed above, economies of scale is one of the greatest 
benefits for mutual fund shareholder. The reducing in expense is 
assumed to be accompanied with increasing in profits for shareholders 
(profit = return - expense). Besides, an efficient manager should be 
able to operate a mutual fund with lower cost, which indicates that 
investment advisors with better performance should have lower 
expense. However, advisors may not want to share these benefits with 
their investors and do not pass the effect of economies of scale and 
better performance to them. As a result, they tend to overcharge the 
advisory fees for their own good. Freeman and Brown (2001) provide 
evidence that only administrative fee but not advisory fee which is 
 34
decreasing with the increase of fund size. They find that advisory fees 
are higher for mutual funds than pension funds, which is another 
evidence for overcharging. Dowen and Mann (2004) find that advisory 
fees have nothing to do with performance and the payments for 
professional service are not fairly charged. 
 
However, conflicts of interest may be small in mutual funds 
compared with open corporations. The characteristics of redeemable 
claims may force managers to compete on better service and lower fees 
to attract more sources of funds, which give incentive to managers to 
act in the interest of shareholders (Fama and Jensen, 1983b). Some 
mechanisms, such as performance salary, board of directors, or internal 
mutual monitoring, can be used to lighten the conflicts of interest 
(Fama, 1980). Furthermore, Coates and Hubbard (2006) point out that 
the comparison of advisory fees between mutual funds and pension 
funds is fault for the differences in the nature and characteristics of 
these two kinds of funds. It may be reasonable because mutual funds 
are actively managed whereas pension funds are passively managed. 
They claim that this kind of analysis in the study of Wharton Report 
(1962) and SEC’s (1966), and Freeman and Brown (2001) are 
meaningless, and the advisory fees are assumed to be fairly charged. In 
response, Freeman (2007) argues that the comparison is suitable. All in 
all, the discussion of mutual fund advisory fees never stops.  
2.4.2 Empirical literature on mutual fund fees 
Some representative empirical works on mutual fund fees and its 
relation to performance, in order to evaluate the advisors’ agent 
behaviors are presented as follows. 
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Herman, E (1963), ‘Mutual fund management fee rates’, The Journal 
of  Finance, Vol. 18, pp. 360-376. 
 
Herman first discusses management fees in regard to fee-related 
suits from late 1950s to early 1960s. Then issues of management fees 
are presented: (1) administrative services to the funds, (2) fund 
performance, and (3) fees and expenses charged clients other than 
mutual fund by investment advisors. He finds that (1) The effective 
management fee rates charged by advisers concentrate on one-half of 1 
percent of fund net assets; (2) Fee rates charged to “other clients” are 
comparably lower than those charged to mutual funds; (3) Management 
fee rates are less impacted by asset size for mutual funds than for other 
clients. 
 
Herman concludes that if there is a conflict of interest in areas such 
as brokerage allocation, turnover policy, and sales effort. The existing 
of this conflict of interest in management fee rates may arouse the 
wonder of whether shareholder interests are always best served. 
 
Ferris, S and Chance, D (1987), ‘The effect of 12b-1 plans on mutual 
fund expense ratios: a note’, The Journal of Finance, Vol. 42, pp. 
1077-1082. 
 
  The study examines the impact of 12b-1 plans on mutual fund 
expanse ratios. The authors explain that 12b-1 plans are only sales 
incentives and that they should have no effect on fund management. 
They use a sample of 300 funds during 1984-1985 and find that 12b-1 
plans are only a dead-weight cost to investors. They denied the 
incentive effect of 12b-1 plan in U.S., which means managers charge 
expense by percentages on net asset value. It is also the way advisory 
 36
fees charged in China. They explain why investors are willing to accept 
this cost as two reasons: (1) the plan was fairly new at the time and (2) 
investors may know very little about them. 
 
Malkiel, B (1995), ‘Returns from investing in equity mutual funds: 
1971 to 1991’, The Journal of Finance, Vol. 50, pp. 549-572. 
 
  In this comprehensive study, Malkiel samples all public equity 
mutual funds for the period 1971-1991 to investigate performance, 
survivorship bias, expenses, and performance persistence. In his 
analysis of expense ratios he finds a strong and significant negative 
relationship between a fund’s total expense ratio and its net 
performance. He find evidence that investment advice expenses are 
associated with positive returns, but attributes this to a few outlying 
funds. This means that investors are not ultimately rewarded for money 
spent on investment advisory fees. 
 
Freeman, J P and Brown, S L (2001), ‘Mutual fund advisory fees: the 
cost of conflicts of interest’, The Journal of Corporation Law, spring, 
pp. 609-673. 
 
  This article examines whether the chief product of professional 
investment advice that shareholders buy when they invest in mutual 
funds is being over-charged by fund managers. The authors present 
four questions to investigate advisory fees imposed on equity mutual 
funds: (1) How the industry’s unique management structure accounts 
for the lack of price competition in the delivery of management advices 
perceived by the industry’s critics? (2) Do economies of scale exist for 
the delivery of investment management services to equity fund 
shareholders? (3) If economies of scale do exist, is it shared with the 
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funds’ owners by the funds’ agents – the investment advisors? (4) Are 
the same advisory fees charged different customers by investment 
advisors? 
 
  The authors show that the external manager in mutual fund 
management structure and inadequacy of mutual fund governance 
gives incentives for advisors to overcharge. By calculating expense of 
mutual funds of different size, the authors find that administrative 
expense ratios decrease with the increase of fund size but advisory fees 
are reluctant to change. Therefore, economies of scale exists in the 
mutual fund industry and it is not shared with fund investors. In a 
comparison between mutual fund and pension fund advisory fees, 
mutual fund advisory fees are overcharged by advisors for the same 
service. 
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Chapter 3 
Methodology and Data 
 
In this paper, the quantitative research method is employed. 
Concerning on the performance of mutual funds, regression analysis 
will be applied to test the Jensen’s Alpha, which indicates the ability of 
mutual funds managers to create greater return than the market index 
(Jensen, 1968). Meanwhile, the advisory fees charged by mutual fund 
management will be examined. First of all, whether advisory fees share 
economies of scale will be shown. It is believed that economies of 
scale will lower the cost of mutual fund investment. If it is true, fees 
will decrease when asset value increases. Finally, the relationship 
between advisory fees and return will be regressed and the coefficient 
between them will be tested. The detail of data and methodology will 
be presented separately for performance and advisory fees in this 
chapter.  
 
3.1 Performance 
  As it is shown in Chapter 2, there are a lot of models measuring 
mutual fund performance. In this paper, Jensen’s alpha will be 
employed to evaluate 53 mutual funds’ performance. 
3.1.1 Research method and statistic technique 
1. Jensen’s alpha 
  As it is mentioned in the previous chapter, there are numerous 
research measurements, which can be categorized as unconditional 
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models and conditional models. The traditional unconditional model 
suggested by Jensen (1968) will be applied in this research. The model 
can be shown as follows: 
Rit - Rft = αi + βi (RMt – Rft) + εit  
where: 
Rit = the return on mutual fund i in month t 
Rft = the return on risk free investment in month t 
RMt = the return on the local equity benchmark in month t 
eit = an error term.  
αi  = Jensen’s alpha 
 
If Rit - Rft > βi (RMt – Rft), which means αi > 0, the portfolio manager 
can earn greater return than market portfolio. If Rit - Rft < βi (RMt – Rft), 
which means αi < 0, the mutual fund performs worse than market 
portfolio. Therefore, the Jensen’s alpha represents the investment 
advisor’s ability. 
 
  Although Jensen’s alpha may not be the best model to evaluate the 
mutual funds performance and the ability of their investment advisors, 
it is one of the most popular and powerful methods for both academic 
research and practitioners (McDonald, 1974; Liu, et al., 2001). Jensen’s 
alpha is a single factor model assumes that a fund’s investment 
behavior can be approximated using a market index. One may argue 
that other factors, such as size and book-to-market value, are necessary 
to examine the performance (Fama and French, 1993). In fact, there are 
many factors for one to choose. In reality, practitioners choose factors 
important to them and formulate their own models. There is no surprise 
that Haugen (2001) uses fifty factors in his model.  
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However, the underpinning of Jensen’s alpha, the CAPM theorem, is 
widely criticized as it is discussed in Chapter two. The ideal 
assumptions and the lack of empirical evidence endanger the 
application of CAPM based models. Concerning on the shortage of 
Jensen’s measure, Roll (1978) points out that the using of a single 
market portfolio as a benchmark is logically inconsistent. Any 
anomalies returns can occur when the market is inefficient since the 
model assumes homogeneous expectations. Grinblatt and Titman (1993) 
state that Jensen’s measure has limitations including: (1) sensitivity to 
the choice of a benchmark and (2) introduction of bias in the evaluation 
of market timers. 
 
2. Ordinary Least Square (OLS) 
  In order to analyze Jensen’s alpha of each mutual fund, regression 
analysis is employed. Regression analysis investigates how a given 
variable is explained by other variables. In other words, Finding the 
line of best fit is what regression analysis does. It is done by 
minimizing the sum of all errors. This method is called the Ordinary 
Least Square (OLS) method. In this research, the model formula of 
Jensen’s alpha can be seen as a regression formula where Rit - Rft is the 
dependent valuable that we want to explain and RMt – Rft the 
independent valuable that we use to explain the adjusted mutual fund 
return. The αi and βi are intercept term and slope term respectively 
which are parameters that estimated regression analysis. According to 
Gauss-Markov theorem, OLS estimates, The αi and βi in this case, are 
Best Linear Unbiased Estimator (BLUE). Best means minimum 
variance (lowest error). Linear means that the estimator is a linear 
function, while Unbiased means that the average or expected value is 
equal to the true value (Gujarati, 2004).  
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  While OLS regression is used, some assumptions and problems of 
this model should be noticed and tested. First of all, as the data of this 
paper is time series data, there is a problem of “spurious regression” 
or “nonsense regression”. It means that the regression may be faked 
by the common trend that drives the unrelated valuables in time series. 
For example, we may obtain a very good fit when we are regressing 
number of cars sold in South Korea and number of accidents in China. 
The main cause of spurious regression is when variables are not 
Stationary, which means a variable has a stochastic or deterministic 
trend. Augmented Dickey-Fuller (ADF) Test, which does not suffer 
from autocorrelation in Dickey-Fuller Test, is employed to find out if 
the data is stationary (Dickey and fuller, 1979). The critical value of 
5% is used as the dividing line between stationary and nonstationary. 
 
  Moreover, if the error terms, εit, in the regression formula are not 
random but systematic, there will be a problem of autocorrelation. It 
means that the error term is correlated with the error terms in the 
previous periods. This can be caused by model misspecification, 
especially omitted variables. With autocorrelation, OLS estimators 
remain Linear, Unbiased as well as consistent but they are no longer 
efficient. The variance of e is no longer minimized. In addition, 
R-Square will be overestimated (Gujarati, 2004). Hence, Durbin 
Watson (DW) Statistics will be tested to explore this problem.  
 
  Although the linear relation formula would be estimated, it might not 
be a good estimation. There are three ways of checking: F-test, 
R-square and adjusted R-square. They all use the Sum of Square (SS), 
where  
Total SS = Explained SS + Residual SS (TSS = ESS + RSS). 
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(1) F-statistic = ESS/RSS, which measures the proportion of variations 
in the residual (RSS) explained by in the explanatory variable (ESS) 
regression model.  
(2) R-Square (R2) = ESS/TSS, which measures the proportion of 
variation in the mutual fund adjusted return (TSS) that is explained by 
the explanatory variable (ESS).  
(3) Adjusted R-Square = 1 – (1- R2) (n-1) / (n-k) (R2~), which adjusts 
the R2 for the number of explanatory variables (k) and sample size (n).  
 
Among these three methods, F-test is quite weak because it does not 
give an indication of how good or how bad the model is, while 
Adjusted R-Square is used only to compare models containing different 
explanatory variables (Gujarati, 2004). For purpose of this research, R2 
is used. For example, R2 = 0.7 means the model is explaining 70% of 
the variation in adjusted mutual fund returns. 
 
  Furthermore, the contribution of each valuable should be noticed. 
Whether the key valuable α is significant explaining the adjusted 
mutual fund returns should be paid attention to. It is shown by P-Value. 
P<0.02 is very significant; 0.02<p<0.05 is significant; 0.05<p<0.1 is 
fairly significant; p>0.1 is not significant. 
 
3. Hypothesis Testing 
  After obtaining α of each mutual fund, whether it is equal to zero is 
key to the test of performance. A null hypothesis (H0) is a statement of 
the status quo, one of no difference or no effect. If H0 is not rejected, 
no changes will be made. On the other hand, an alternative hypothesis 
(H1) is one in which some difference or effect is expected. Accepting 
the alternative hypothesis will lead to changes in opinions (Cooper and 
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Schindler, 2003). Concerning on Jensen’s alphas: 
H0: The mean of Jensen’s alphas of mutual funds = 0 
H1: The mean of Jensen’s alphas of mutual funds≠0 
  To test H0, it is necessary to select a test statistic which measures 
how close the sample has come to the null hypothesis. T-test is adopted 
to test the null hypothesis in this research,  
n
xt
σ
Π−
=  
where: 
σ = sample deviation 
n = number of samples 
X = sample mean 
∏ = the test value, 0 in this case.  
 
If t-statistic > critical value, we reject H0. If t-statistic < critical value, 
we do not reject H0. In this paper, significance level of p = 5% is used 
to calculate the critical value, which means the lowest significance 
level at which a null hypothesis can be rejected is 5%. Meanwhile, the 
p-value can be also seen as the risk of rejecting a null hypothesis 
although it is true, known as type one error. For example, p = 0.2 
means the chance of committing type one error is 20%. It is larger than 
the risk of 5% we are prepared to take and the null hypothesis can not 
be rejected. Every t-statistic has a counterpart p-value. It is always 
clearer to compare p-value of the test with 5% critical significance. 
3.1.2 Data collection and selection 
  According to the research method aforementioned, the required data 
are mutual funds rates of return, a benchmark of market index rate of 
return and risk free rate of return. The time horizon is two years from 
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Friday 1st July, 2005 to Friday 29th June, 2007. The relatively short 
time horizon is mainly due to the short mutual fund history in China. It 
will be discussed as a limitation in Chapter 4. 
 
1. Mutual funds rates of return 
  Currently, over three hundred mutual funds are operating on the 
Chinese market. Among these, there are money market funds, equity 
funds and bond funds. Only equity funds, who invest primarily in 
stocks, are in the scope of this research. The reason is that funds mainly 
invest in money market securities and fixed-income sector may not fit 
the model properly. Money market funds and bond funds may 
demonstrate a weak correlation to the benchmark of stock market index, 
thus their explanatory power may not be strong.  
 
Due to the time horizon starts from 1st July, 2005, funds established 
later are excluded. In order to compare the active management with a 
passive strategy, mutual funds who adapt passive index mimicking 
strategies are excluded. This research includes only active managed 
equity mutual funds whose objectives are seeking abnormally returns 
through active-managed professional skills. Finally, there are 55 mutual 
funds from 30 investment companies in the sample. Their rates of 
return are calculated as: 
1
1
−
−
+−
=
t
ttt
it NAV
DNAVNAVR   
where: 
NAVt = Net Asset Value on time t 
NAVt-1 = Net Asset Value on time t-1 
Dt = dividends on time t.  
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In order to reflect the true rates of return, unit NAV is used in 
calculation. Data of daily unit NAV are collected on the website of each 
mutual fund. Then, monthly rates of return of sample mutual funds are 
calculated. Since all the mutual funds in the sample survive till now, 
there is no survivorship bias. The information of sample mutual funds, 
including their codes, names and NAV, are presented on Appendix 1. 
 
2. Benchmark 
  The selection of market index is of great importance. In China, there 
are two stock exchanges, Shanghai Stock Exchange (SHSE) and 
Shenzhen Stock Exchange (SZSE). All of the mutual funds in data 
invest in both of the two stock markets. For the sake of balance and 
better representation of market performance trend, Shanghai Shenzhen 
300 Index (SHSE-SZSE300) is chosen. SHSE-SZSE300 was published 
by SHSE and SZSE. It is the first unified index on the Chinese stock 
market, which selects 300 listed A shares companies on SHSE and 
SZSE. It represents over 60% of the two stock markets’ sum of market 
value. The base day is 31st December, 2004, which is similar to history 
to mutual funds in China. The base value is 1000.  
 
Figure 4  
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As it is shown in Figure 4, the market index had a upward trend 
during the time horizon of this research. Its rate of return (Rmt) is 
calculated as:  
RMt = (Indext – Indext-1) / Indext-1 
where:  
Indext = the index value on time t 
Indext-1 = the index value on time t-1 
 
3. Risk free rate 
  The risk free rate is the rate of return shares no market risk. In 
researches of mutual fund performance, the popular risk free rate is the 
rate of 3-month Treasury Bills. However, the duration of Chinese 
Treasury Bill starts from one year, which means 3-month Treasury 
Bills are not available. Moreover, the bond market in China in far from 
efficient. Hence, there is no common standard risk free rate in China 
(Tu and Zhang, 2005). In this paper, 3-month time deposit interest rate 
is employed, because bank deposit interest rate is fixed and free from 
default risk. This paper neglects the slightly rise of this rate in 2006 and 
uses a constant risk-free rate, which is the 3-month time deposit interest 
rate in 2006 and 2007. The annualized rate is 2.34%. And the effective 
monthly interest rate is calculated by 2.34%/12, which equals to 
0.00195. 
 
Although it is considered to be insignificant, this constant risk-free 
rate might underestimate the actual return of both active and passive 
management. However, Tu and Zhang’s (2004) choice of one-year time 
deposit interest rate is even higher. There is no consensus on choosing 
risk-free rate in China. Nonetheless, this constant risk-free rate will be 
referred to as a limitation of this paper. 
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3.2 Advisory Fees 
  Operating a mutual fund is a costly undertaking. Management must 
be compensated. Custodial and transfer agency fees must be paid. 
Investment research must be conducted. All of these result in a 
reduction of the return available to share holders. Shareholders have a 
strong interest in knowing that their fund is operated as efficiently as 
possible. It is expected that the better performing funds will have lower 
expense ratios. 
3.2.1 Research method and statistic technique 
1. Economies of scale 
  Economies of scale is one of the strong advantages shared by mutual 
funds, where there is an inverse relationship between assets under 
management and their operating expense ratios. The notion of 
economies of scale arises in the context of a manufacturing firm. As the 
number of units of output increases, total costs increase, but not as 
rapidly as output, so that average unit costs decrease as output 
increases. Such economies typically arise from spreading fixed costs 
among more units of production. The portfolio management process, 
which underpins advisory services, is characterized by high fixed costs 
(offices, computers, salaries, etc.) and very low variable costs. Thus, as 
a SEC report (1992) states, “a portfolio manager can manage $500 
million nearly as easily as $100 million”. Since advisory services are 
subject to economies of scale, the fund’s advisor may not pass along 
the largess to the fund. If economies of scale exist and fees are not 
lowered when assets under management increase, then the benefits of 
increased scale accrue to the manager in the form of increased profits. 
This can be especially insidious in a bull market environment. The 
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GAO’s report (2000) on price competition in the fund industry found 
that 64% of fund portfolio growth is due to portfolio appreciation. This 
appreciation benefits investment advisors who garner increased fees 
from the general increase in market prices with no commensurate 
efforts on their part. 
 
  Nonetheless, it is accepted today that economies of scale exist in the 
fund industry. In the U.S., the existence of economies of scale has been 
admitted in SEC filings made by funds managers and is implicit in the 
industry’s frequent use of fee rates that decrease as assets under 
management increase (Freeman, 1978). However, mutual funds fee 
rates seldom decreased in China in its history. Followed the research of 
Freeman and Brown (2001), the 55 mutual funds in the data base will 
be group by their fund size.  
 
There are four groups: (1) NAV<1billion (b); (2) 1b<NAV<5b; (3) 
5b<NAV<10b; (4) NAV>10b. The average operating expense ratios 
and advisory expense ratios of each group will be calculated to see 
whether they are decreasing as the NAV increases. 
 
2. OLS 
The OLS regression model is employed to investigate the relation 
between advisory fee rates and rates of mutual fund return. The 
following model is used: 
Fee = α + β (Ri) + εit 
The null hypothesis can be described as: there is no relation between 
performance and advisory fee ratio. In this case, the coefficient of rate 
of return, β, in the model is equal to zero. Although α is also in the 
equation, it is meaningful only if β is not zero. Therefore, the 
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hypotheses are transformed into: 
H0: β = 0 
H1: β ≠ 0 
 
The advisory fee rates and the 2 year rate of return of 55 mutual 
funds in the sample will be regressed. If the R2 of this formula is 
satisfied, advisory fee rates will have a linear relation with return. In 
this case, α and β will be able to explain the correlation of these two 
variables. 
3.2.2 Data collection and selection 
1. Mutual fund expense ratio and Net Asset Value (NAV) 
  The funds’ expenses are collected from Morningstar. The expense 
ratio includes operating expenses and management fees. Meanwhile, 
the NAV of each mutual in the data of this research are also collected 
from Morningstar. The advisory and administrative fee ratios, and NAV 
of each mutual fund in the sample are listed in Appendix 1. 
 
2. Mutual funds two year rate of return 
  The rate of return is calculated by the formula above. The only 
difference is that the time span between t and t-1 is two years, from 1st 
July, 2005 to 29th June, 2007. The results of calculation of rate of return 
for each mutual fund in the sample are presented in the right end 
column in Appendix 1. 
 
 
 
 
 50
Chapter 4 
Findings and Discussion 
 
  Findings will be presented and analyzed in this chapter. The order of 
methodologies in Chapter 3 will be followed. After the analyzing of 
results, the causes of them will be discussed in detail. 
 
4.1 Results and analysis 
  In order to evaluate the performance and advisory fees of mutual 
funds in China, quantitative tests are conducted as they are described in 
Chapter 3. The statistics results will be presented and analyzed in this 
part. 
4.1.1 Testing of variables and regression assumption 
1. Stationary 
  A time series variable is said to be stationary if 1) mean is constant 
over time; 2) variance is constant over time; 3) covariance for a given 
lag is constant over time (Gujarati, 2004). If any of them is not satisfied, 
then time series is nonstationary. When there exit a problem of 
nonstationary, regression coefficient will not make sense since they are 
not fixed over time. Therefore, the testing of stationary determines the 
validity of the analysis in this paper.  
 
  To illustrate the result of stationary testing, the concept of unit root 
should be first introduced. The relationship of time series data can be 
shown as a random walk model (RWM) of  
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Yt = Yt-1 + ut. 
where the value of Yt is equal to value in previous period Yt-1 plus a 
random shock ut. It is clear that E(Yt) is constant and Var(Yt) = tσ2  is 
not constant, depending on t. Hence a RWM is nonstationary, which 
shares a stochastic trend. From the general First Order Autoregressive 
process 
Yt = ρYt-1 + ut. 
if ρ= 1, then we have a RWM equation above. Therefore, if a series has 
a Unit Root (ρ= 1), it is nonstationary. According to Dickey and Fuller 
(1979), the regression model to test the unit root can be written as  
∆Yt = (ρ − 1)Yt − 1 + ut = δYt − 1 + ut, 
where ∆ is the first difference operator. Instead of testing ρ directly, 
Dickey and Fuller tested a null hypothesis of δ = 0, where ρ = 1 + δ = 1. 
If the null hypothesis is accepted, there is a problem of unit root in the 
time series and the sample is nonstationary. Since t test is not valid if Y 
is nonstationary (null hypothesis), Dickey and Fuller (1979) introduce 
tau (τ) test which is also known as Dickey-Fuller Test.  
 
Although τ table is used to replace t-table, they are of the same 
procedure (Gujarati, 2004). In fact, t statistics are still used in the τ 
table. However, the error term ut may suffer from autocorrelation thus 
the t-statistics will not be valid. To solve this problem, lag values of 
∆Yt are added to augment the equation. This is known as Augmented 
Dickey-Fuller (ADF) Test. 
 
  The result of ADF is given by the τ table in Appendix 2. Theτ
-statistic is similar to t-statistic in the way of comparing to critical 
value. The 5% critical value equals to -3.0038, which means the null 
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hypothesis of unit root will be rejected if τ < -3.0038. For example, 
the τ of SHSE-SZSE300, equals to -3.485101, is smaller then the 
critical value. So the null hypothesis of unit root existing in the time 
series of SHSE-SZSE300 is rejected. Hence, the data of the benchmark, 
Rmt, is stationary. As it is presented, all of the valuables in the sample 
have a τ-statistic under the critical value, which means they do not 
have unit root and the problem of nonstationary. Therefore, there are 
not any trends in the data and the later analysis of Ordinary Lease 
Square (OLS) does not bear the risk of being “spurious regression”. 
 
2. Autocorrelation 
  Autocorrelation may endanger the result of OLS due to the 
correlation of error terms. During the estimation of Jensen’s alpha, the 
correlations of error term, eit, are shown by Durbin Watson (DW) 
Statistics. Durbin and Watson (1950) calculate the DW Statistics by 
using the equation of  
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whose value is always between 0 an 4. The closer to 0 or 4, there is 
problem of autocorrelation, while the closer to a value of 2 indicates no 
autocorrelation.  
 
  The DW Statistics are tested together with OLS regression 
estimation. The results for each regression model are presented on the 
last column in Appendix 3 and table 7. The results are ranging from 
1.11 to 2.494 in Appendix 3 with an average value of 1.935. For the 
regression model of relation between performance and advisory fees, 
the DW = 2.039. Although DW method does not indicate how close is 
close, it is noticeable that the DW in the table in much closer to 2 than 
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0 and 4. Therefore, the problem of autocorrelation is weak. 
 
4.1.2 Jensen’s alpha 
  As it is explained in the chapter of methodology, Jensen’s alpha is 
used to measure the excess return of investment portfolios of mutual 
funds over the require rate of return determined by CAPM. It 
represents investment advisors’ capability, including stock selection, 
market timing and diversification. This measure of portfolio 
performance, which indicates the ability of a manager, is defined as the 
difference between the actual returns on a mutual fund in any particular 
holding period and the expected returns on that mutual fund conditional 
on the risk-free rate, its level of systematic risk, and the actual returns 
on the market portfolio (Jensen, 1968). It is captured by αi in the 
following regression model: 
Rit - Rft = αi + βi (RMt – Rft) + εit. 
where a positive αi represents that the professional investment advisor 
outperforms market index, while a negative αi means 
underperformance. The higher the value of αi, the better the 
performance of the mutual fund. The result of OLS regression is shown 
in the Table 1: 
 
Table 1 
Jensen’s alpha 
Code R-Square α P-Value β P-Value DW 
000001 0.114 -0.001 0.975 0.337 0.107 2.07 
000011 0.747 0.009 0.463 0.864 0.000 1.428 
002001 0.404 -0.019 0.240 0.636 0.001 1.28 
002011 0.131 0.006 0.823 0.362 0.082 1.26 
20001 0.430 -0.002 0.920 0.656 0.001 1.11 
20003 0.304 0.004 0.837 0.551 0.005 2.053 
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20005 0.760 0.008 0.434 0.872 0.000 1.452 
040002 0.980 -0.001 0.648 0.990 0.000 2.135 
050001 0.091 -0.005 0.896 0.302 0.152 2.155 
050002 0.062 -0.005 0.888 0.250 0.239 1.554 
050004 0.041 0.007 0.835 0.202 0.343 2.111 
070006 0.867 0.002 0.739 0.931 0.000 1.338 
080001 0.112 -0.004 0.883 0.335 0.110 1.996 
090001 0.040 0.006 0.856 0.200 0.348 2.124 
090003 0.211 0.007 0.733 0.459 0.024 1.541 
090004 0.059 0.002 0.947 0.243 0.253 2.494 
100020 0.498 -0.028 0.267 0.706 0.000 2.05 
100022 0.068 0.010 0.721 0.262 0.217 2.054 
110002 0.827 -0.003 0.792 0.910 0.000 1.439 
110003 0.163 -0.017 0.640 0.404 0.050 2.179 
110005 0.168 -0.022 0.566 0.410 0.047 2.031 
160105 0.047 0.008 0.783 0.217 0.309 2.059 
160505 0.049 0.020 0.505 0.220 0.300 2.189 
160605 0.070 0.006 0.871 0.265 0.211 2.186 
161604 0.263 6.3E-05 0.997 0.513 0.010 2.233 
161606 0.150 -0.010 0.773 0.388 0.061 2.131 
161607 0.560 -0.027 0.045 0.749 0.000 1.882 
162201 0.026 0.014 0.610 0.160 0.455 1.947 
162202 0.025 0.013 0.727 0.157 0.463 2.102 
162203 0.034 0.002 0.944 0.184 0.390 1.991 
162204 0.666 0.007 0.626 0.816 0.000 1.926 
162605 0.166 -0.027 0.456 0.408 0.048 1.83 
162703 0.078 0.020 0.490 0.279 0.187 2.087 
180003 0.312 -0.048 0.118 0.559 0.005 2.186 
200002 0.975 0.007 0.039 0.988 0.000 1.818 
202001 0.021 0.006 0.870 0.143 0.504 2.353 
206001 0.718 0.017 0.054 0.870 0.000 1.701 
206102 0.071 0.001 0.961 0.266 0.209 1.857 
213002 0.092 -0.030 0.388 0.362 0.082 1.898 
240005 0.706 0.011 0.257 0.840 0.000 1.814 
260101 0.166 -0.027 0.456 0.408 0.048 1.83 
260104 0.405 0.016 0.322 0.636 0.001 1.371 
270001 0.145 0.002 0.921 0.381 0.066 1.767 
290002 0.118 0.008 0.766 0.343 0.100 1.967 
350002 0.622 0.008 0.417 0.789 0.000 2.415 
360001 0.078 -0.004 0.915 0.279 0.187 2.179 
375010 0.658 0.003 0.848 0.811 0.000 1.715 
398001 0.093 0.008 0.752 0.305 0.147 2.172 
400001 0.171 -0.016 0.552 0.414 0.044 2.267 
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410001 0.140 -0.025 0.449 0.374 0.072 1.342 
460001 0.180 -0.003 0.899 0.424 0.039 2.358 
510081 0.003 0.011 0.742 0.052 0.811 2.185 
519180 0.252 0.001 0.980 0.502 0.012 2.214 
519996 0.323 -0.030 0.308 0.569 0.004 2.181 
580001 0.011 0.010 0.637 0.107 0.619 2.43 
Average  -0.00171    1.935 
 
In the table, each mutual fund has its own regression estimators. 
Together with Jensen’s alpha, β and R2 of the model are also given. For 
instance, as can be seen in Table 1, Huaxia DP (000011) outperforms 
the market index by 0.9% (Jensen’s α) and only bears 86.4% (β) of the 
market risk. The regression model estimated from the adjusted return 
rates of Huaxia DP and SHSE-SZSE300 is explaining 74.7% (R2) of 
variation in the adjusted return rates of the fund. The capability of 
investment advisor of this mutual fund is confirmed. With regard to the 
Jensen’s alpha of 55 mutual funds in the sample, they range from 
-0.048 to 0.02 with the average of -0.00171. Although the simple 
average value of Jensen’s alpha is negative, the overall performance of 
mutual funds may not necessarily underperform the market index, for 
the number of outperforming funds is exceeding their counterparts. 
There are 33 out of 55 mutual funds have a positive Jensen’s α, which 
means that 60% funds have outperforming portfolios compare with 
40% underperforming ones. It can be shown in the following table: 
 
Table 2  
Positive Jensen’s alpha VS negative Jensen’s alpha 
 Number of Mutual Funds Range of Jensen’s Alpha 
Outperform 33 (60%) 0.02 ~ 0.000063 
Underperform 22 (40%) -0.001 ~ -0.048 
 
Therefore, the negative average value of Jensen’s alpha is because 
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that the absolute values of underperforming funds are greater than that 
of outperforming ones. For example, as in Table 2, the best fund 
advisor obtains a 2% excess rate of return whereas the worse advisor 
gains 4.8% rate of return lower than the return rate of market index. 
Although the number of underperforming mutual funds is smaller, the 
underperformance is severe.  
 
Under careful observation, there are 14 investment companies have 
all of their mutual funds, 23 funds in total, outperformed the market 
index. It is noticeable that the best five companies among them contain 
14 mutual funds with positive Jensen’s alpha. In other words, nearly 
half of outperforming mutual funds are coming from 16% investment 
companies in China. On the other hand, there are only 9 investment 
companies underperform all mutual funds under their management. It 
can be summarized as: 
 
Table 3  
Performance of investment companies 
 
Number of 
Investment 
Companies 
Percentage
Number 
of Mutual 
Funds 
Percentage
Pure 
Outperform 
14 47% 23 42% 
Pure 
Underperform 
9 30% 11 20% 
Mix 
Performance 
7 23% 21 38% 
Total 30 100% 55 100% 
 
The pure outperforming investment companies own twice (42%) as 
much as mutual funds (20%) in pure underperforming investment 
companies. This is not only consistent to the analysis above, but also 
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indicates that the professional management of investment advisors 
from some investment companies may contribute to the performance of 
mutual funds. Table 3 also implies that the investors may take 
investment companies into account when selecting mutual funds. 
 
In order to further investigate the significance of the existence of the 
Jensen’s alpha, hypothesis testing is launched. The method is 
comparing the values of Jensen’s alpha estimated by OLS regression 
model previously with the value of zero. Recall the null hypothesis in 
the last chapter, we have: 
H0: The mean of Jensen’s alphas of mutual funds = 0 
H1: The mean of Jensen’s alphas of mutual funds ≠ 0 
The result of t-test is given in Table 4 below: 
 
Table 4  
T-test for Jensen’s alpha 
Test Value = 0 
 
Number Mean Std. 
Deviation 
t P-Value
Jensen’s 
alpha 
55 -0.001708 0.0149515 -0.847 0.401 
 
The t-statistics is -0.847 with a p-value of 0.401. It means that the 
risk of committing type error is 40.1%. This significance level (p-value) 
associated with the test is much higher than the risk we are preparing to 
take. Hence, the null hypothesis can not be rejected and the mean of 
Jensen’s alpha is equal to zero. Therefore, the existence of the overall 
Jensen’s alpha in the mutual fund industry in China is denied and the 
overall professional skills of investment advisors in China are not 
significant. From another aspect, Jensen’s alphas of mutual funds share 
very high p-values in Table 1, where only two alphas have p-values 
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lower than the critical value of 5%. The highest p-value is 99.7% which 
means that the alpha of this fund can be neglected without risk of type 
one error. 
 
This shouldn’t come as a surprise as the standard deviation of the 55 
observations of Jensen’s alpha is very small. In addition, the difference 
between zero and the mean value is very tiny as well. As can be seen in 
Table 1 and Table 2, the span between positive α and negative α is only 
0.068 and 35 out of 55 funds (64%) have absolute value of α not larger 
than 0.01. The difference between good management and bad 
management is somewhat trivial. 
 
The result of Jensen’s alpha further indicates that active managed 
equity mutual funds as a whole in China do not outperform the passive 
strategy. The passive strategy has lower expense because there is no 
frequent transaction in such a buy-and-hold strategy. It seems a better 
choice than the active managed strategy. This funding is in line with 
market efficiency and suggests that EMH is proofed in China and the 
Chinese capital market might be seen as efficient. 
4.1.3 Economies of scale in fee structure 
  After the testing of mutual funds performance, it seems that 
professional investment advisors do not exercise quite a good job to 
capture the excess return for their investors. The wonder of the 
worthiness of fees paying for professional portfolio management 
become greater. In the following analysis, the fee structure and whether 
fees are reasonable charged are studied in detail. 
 
  First of all, whether investing expenses, paid by investors, benefit 
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from the economies of scale will be explored. In Table 5, mutual funds 
in the sample are divided into 4 groups according to their Net Asset 
Value as fund size. The average operating expense ratio of each group 
is calculated together with the average advisory expense and average 
administrative expense. The operating expense ratio is the combination 
of advisory fee ratio and administrative fee ratio (Freeman, and Brown, 
2001). 
 
Table 5 
Economies of scale 
Fund Size 
(Billion) 
Number 
of Funds 
Average 
Operating 
Expense 
Ratios (%) 
Average 
Advisory 
Expense 
Ratios 
(%) 
Average 
Administrative 
Expense 
Ratios (%) 
< 1 b 9 1.6833 1.4444 0.2389 
1b<NAV<5b 24 1.6763 1.4367 0.2396 
5b<NAV<10b 14 1.7286 1.4786 0.2500 
NAV>10b 8 1.6100 1.3725 0.2375 
Total 55 1.6811 1.4393 0.2418 
 
  Except for the group of 5b<NAV<10b, the ratios of other groups 
exhibit a steady decreasing trend as the funds’ size increased. From the 
group of NAV < RMB1 billion to the group of NAV > RMB10 billion, 
average operating expense ratios decrease from 1.6833% to 1.61%, 
while advisory fee ratios from 1.4444% to 1.3725% and administrative 
fee ratios from 0.2389% to 0.2375%. Both advisory expense ratios and 
administrative expense ratios contribute to the decline in overall 
operating ratios.  
 
It may be useful to put the analysis into a larger context. The 55 
funds in the sample represent a total value of RMB292.6 billion. With 
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an average operating expense ratio of 1.6811%, the mutual fund 
industry is charging shareholders of this subset of mutual funds about 
RMB5 Billion a year to manage their funds. The 8 funds with asset 
greater than RMB10 Billion represent about RMB122.6 billion, and 
their annual management costs are about RMB1.97 billion. Of the 
RMB2 billion, about RMB1.68 billion are charged for advisory 
services and about RMB0.29 billion for administration. As it is seen, 
advisory and administrative costs decrease as fund size increases. But 
advisory expenses are declining more rapidly. Had administrative costs 
declined by the same percentage as advisory costs, they would average 
0.2270% instead of 0.2375%, yielding annual administrative expense 
of RMB0.28 billion. Thus, under the assumption that economies of 
scale should be realized for advisory fees and administrative fees 
equally, in rough numbers there are about RMB10 million excess 
administrative fees paid annually to the largest group of mutual funds.  
 
At the first glance, it may be reasonable to say that economies of 
scale exist in the China mutual fund industry and advisory fees paid for 
professionals reduce with increase in size. However, the group of 
5b<NAV<10b should not be omitted. The percentages in all of kinds of 
expense ratios is even greater than the ratios in the group of mutual 
funds with smallest NAV (<1b). More important, the differences 
between ratios of groups are not obvious. They are all below 0.08%. 
Therefore, the effect of economies of scale does not seem strong. This 
can be explained as either (1) the size of mutual funds in China may 
not reach the level of economies of scale, or (2) fund managers do not 
share economies of scale in the entire expense (both advisory fees and 
administrative fees). The slower decline in administrative expense than 
advisory expense may give evidence to the first explanation. The 
reluctance of decreasing in administrative expense shows that mutual 
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funds in China may have a fix amount of administrative costs 
regardless of their size. In Freeman and Brown’s (2001) study, advisory 
fees are overcharged. Their result is presented in Table 6. 
 
Table 6 
Economies of scale in the U.S. 
Fund Size 
($mm) 
Number of 
Funds 
Average 
Operating 
Expense 
Ratios 
(Basic 
Point) 
Average 
Advisory 
Expense 
Ratios 
(Basic 
Point) 
Average 
Administrative 
Expense 
Ratios (Basic 
Point) 
<$250 1,295 114 71 43 
$250-500 272 104 71 33 
$500-1000 228 98 67 30 
$1000-5000 274 85 61 24 
>$5000 92 63 46 17 
Overall 2,161 75 54 21 
 
Administrative fee level decline steadily as fund size grows, while 
advisory fee level does not significantly change until it reaches the 
largest goup. Freeman and Brown (2001) conclude their study that 
investment advisors keep the benefit of economies of scale for their 
own good and there is a premium paying for the conflicts of interest.  
 
Compare with mutual fund industry in the U.S., the sizes of mutual 
funds in China are much smaller than in the U.S. The smallest group in 
the U.S., $250mm, is about 200 times larger than the biggest group, 
RMB10 billion (about $1.3b), in China. Together with the comparison 
of the number of funds on the market, it is no doubt to conclude that 
the entire size mutual fund industry is rather small in China. 
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  Therefore, although advisory fees are declined as fund sizes increase, 
it is based on the trivial effect of economies of scale. Due to the seldom 
change of advisory fees in the history of mutual funds in China, the 
decline of advisory fees ratio may not be an outcome of competition. 
Although the NAV of many mutual funds have substantially increased, 
their fees level remains the same. 
4.1.4 Relation between performance and advisory fees 
  Now that the performance and advisory fees have been analyzed, the 
relation between them is under consideration. According to the 
analyses above, the performance of mutual fund advisors, which is 
captured by Jensen’s alpha, are disappointing and the advisory fees do 
not share the economies of scale. One might think that the professional 
investment advice for mutual funds does not worth the advisory fees it 
charges. However, this does not indicate that the performance of 
mutual funds has nothing to with advisory fees. It is expected that the 
better a mutual fund perform, the lower expense ratios, including 
advisory fee ratio, it will have (Dowen and Mann, 2004). The result of 
this part further indicates whether fees are charged reasonable. 
 
Therefore, it is necessary to estimate the relation by regressing the 
advisory fees by the rate of return of mutual funds: 
Fee = α + β (Ri) + εit 
The relation is shown by the β coefficient of this regression model. As 
it is stated in the last chapter, the hypotheses are: 
H0: β = 0 
H1: β ≠ 0 
The result of OLS regression is demonstrated in Table 7 as follows. 
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Table 7 
Relation between performance and advisory fees 
R-Square α P-Value β P-Value DW 
0.015 0.015 0.000 -0.123 0.369 2.039 
 
  The β coefficient is -0.123, which represents a negative relation 
between advisory fee ratio and performance as expected. However, this 
β value is not reliable for the p-value of this coefficient is 36.9%. Since 
the risk (39.9%) of committing type one error is much higher than the 
critical p-value of 5%, null hypothesis can not be rejected. Thus, β is 
considered to be zero. Although α coefficient has a zero p-value, it is 
meaningless as the valuable of rate of return, Ri, is disable by β = 0. 
Moreover, the R-Square of this model is 1.5%. The model is very bad 
in that it can only explain 1.5% of variation in mutual fund 
performance. This can be another proof that the relation between 
performance and advisory fees does not exist in China mutual fund 
industry currently. 
 
4.2 Limitations of the research 
  This research is trying to evaluate the mutual fund investment 
advisors in two major aspects: mutual fund performance and advisory 
fees. In other words, how much they give and get. While using 
theoretical frameworks and statistic techniques to explore the research 
questions, some limitations inherit in the process of analysis. They will 
be discussed in this part.  
4.2.1 Theoretical method 
  In the study of the mutual fund performance, Jensen’s alpha is used 
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as the representative of excess return realized by investment advisors. 
The underpinning of this estimator is the Capital Asset Pricing Model 
(CAPM) developed by Sharpe and Lintner (Jensen, 1969).  
 
However, CAPM is not faultless. As many other famous theorems, 
CAPM is based on series of assumptions: 
1. There is a perfect competition market, where investors are only 
price-takers. 
2. All investors plan for on an identical holding period.  
3. Investments are limited to a universe of publicly traded financial 
assets, such as stocks and bonds, and to risk-free borrowing and 
lending arrangements. They may borrow or lend any amount at 
risk-free rate. 
4. Investors pay no taxes on returns and no transaction costs 
(commissions and service charges) on trades in securities.  
5. All investors use Markowitz portfolio selection model. They are 
rational mean-variance optimizers. 
6. All investors analyze securities in the same and share the same 
economic view of the world.  
 
Obviously, they ignore many real-world complexities and they are 
therefore widely attacked. Even in a mature and well-established 
capital market like the one in the U.S., a perfect competition market in 
assumption 1 is not available (Freeman and Brown, 2001). In China, 
although the capital market is developing rapidly, it is facing many 
problems and it is not under perfect competition. For example, 
problems of information disclosure are severe in China (Du, 2003; Liu, 
2006). Besides, the single-period horizon in assumption 2 ignore 
everything might happen after the holding period, which is not comply 
with the reality (Bodie, et al., 2005). In China, there is no certain 
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market for securitization of bonds, which makes borrowing and lending 
risk-free rate difficult (assumption 3). There may be no investment free 
from taxes and transaction costs, as it is stated in assumption 4. 
Moreover, investors are not identical (assumption 5 and 6). They have 
their own risk preferences.  
 
Furthermore, many empirical tests confirm that CAPM has limited 
power in analyzing capital market in China (Li and Li, 2000; Li and 
Wu, 2003; Sun, 2003; Sun, et al., 2006; Zhang, et al., 2000). Although 
β is related to the return to some extent, there may be other parameters, 
such as size effect and P/E ratio (Basu, 1983) may be more significant. 
As it is shown in Table 1, some of the R-Squares are low. These models 
of low explanatory power may be explained as CAPM is not perfect. 
4.2.2 Statistic techniques 
  The limitation of test methods for stationary and autocorrelation 
should be noticed. In terms of Augmented Dickey-Fuller (ADF) test, it 
focuses only on first order autoregressive but may ignore moving 
average (MA) component in the stochastic process. This may increase 
the type one error of rejecting a true null hypothesis (Gujarati, 2004). 
Concerning on Durbin Watson (DW) Statistics, the closer to the values 
of 0 and 4, there is the problem of autocorrelation. But how close is 
close is not defined. In this research, data are considered to be free 
from autocorrelation since they are closer to 2. 
4.2.3 Data 
  First of all, the benchmark selected is not exactly as it is required by 
CAPM. In this research, SHSE-SZSE300 index is used as a proxy of 
market portfolio. However, SHSE-SZSE300 index can not represent 
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the whole stock market movement in China. Its rate of return is not 
exactly the perfectly diversified market rate of return (Rm).  
 
  Secondly, the time horizon is limited in two years. Normally, the 
time horizon of similar study is three years or five years, or even much 
longer. The longer the time horizon, the less the effect of luck. As the 
Equity Investment Fund Act of China went into effect in the middle of 
2004, mutual funds had not been normalized until then. It may be safe 
to select rates of return one year later when mutual funds become 
normalized and regulated. Besides, the number of mutual funds is 
limited. Therefore, the longer time horizon is not adopted. 
 
  Thirdly, the adaptation of risk-free rate is not the “international 
standard” rate of Treasury Bills. Instead, a constant 1-month time 
deposit interest rate is used. It may affect results of Jensen’s alpha. 
 
  Fourthly, in the analysis of economies of scale in advisory fees, the 
average ratio of fees is used. In the similar research of Freeman and 
Brown (2001), the average ratios of fees are transformed into basic 
points, which make the comparison clearer. Freeman and Brown (ibid.) 
obtain them from Morningstar data base. However, they are not 
available for mutual funds in China. 
 
4.3 Further discussion of causes 
  Some further discussion of causes of the results in this paper will be 
identified and explained. The focus of this part is specifically focus on 
the capital market in China and detail information of Chinese mutual 
funds. 
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4.3.1 The hand of the Chinese government 
The Chinese government is always interfering into the capital market, 
in order to control the state of economy. Either too fast or too slow in 
development is not acceptable to the Chinese government. It is 
reasonable to ensure the stability of economy, but the strong power and 
frequent interferences limited the performance of mutual fund 
managers as well as other investors on the market. 
 
During the nearly thirty years of fast growing in GDP, the 
government is very sensitive to bubbles. Macro control is the state 
policy of China to solve this problem. The government is always 
claiming that the macro control in stock market will be strengthened. 
The style of its macro control is strong and suddenness. For example, 
the measure on 30th May, 2007 is referred to as the “killing of the bull” 
in the media in China. It can be shown as the following figure. 
Figure 5 
Movements of SHSE-SZSE300 index – an example of the strong 
effect of macro control on stock market in China 
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  As it is illustrated by SHSE-SZSE300 index, stock market is 
experiencing an overall up trend during August 2006 and May 2007. 
The bull market is obvious from March to May in 2007. All of a 
sudden, the Ministry of Finance increased the stamp tax from 1‰ to 3
‰ on 30th May. On the following two exchange days, hundreds of 
stocks felled to their limit downs every day. The SHSE-SZSE300 index 
had dropped from 4168 to 3511 points in these three days, which 
means that the market value shrinks by approximately 16%. The 
market still does not recover in July, 2007. Therefore, the government 
power is very strong in crushing the bubbles. On the other hand, this 
measure is a sudden move. Just a week before 30th May, the 
government claimed that an increase in the stamp tax was just a rumor. 
This even is not alone in the economic history of China, not even 
limited in capital market. The style of strong and suddenness in macro 
control is applied to many other aspects, for example the sudden 
appreciation of exchange rate1. 
 
  This phenomenon can be seen as a great uncertainty in capital 
market. It does not affect the stock prices until the measures are 
announced. Therefore, the information is reflected immediately in 
stock prices and the stock market movement under this effect is random 
walk as in Efficient Market Hypothesis (Malkiel, 2003). Mutual fund 
managers, as well as other investors, can not predict this movement no 
mater how professional they are. Their return may not be able to beat 
the market available as the result of Jensen’s alpha in this paper. 
 
                                                        
1 China suddenly appreciated its currency RMB by 2% in the exchange rate towards U.S. 
dollar on 21st July, 2005. It is milestone of the change of exchange rate system of China, for the 
floating exchange rate is stated to replace the fixed interest rate. Before that day, the 
government denied the possibility of appreciation for a year in order to prevent the currency 
market and the whole economy from speculation. 
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4.3.2 Loose law environment 
As it is analyzed in this paper, the payment for investment advisors 
does not share the economies of scale, and also irrelevant to the 
performance they provide. The phenomenon of overcharged advisory 
fees is very significant. However, mutual funds seldom change their fee 
structure although their performances are not impressive. It is silently 
allowed by the law environment in China. 
 
On 1st June, 2004, the implementing of Act of People’s Republic of 
China on Security Investment Funds (2004) starts the era of standard 
mutual fund industry in China. A month later, the Security Investment 
Funds Operation Measure (2004) was in act. The management, 
operation, distribution of profit and many details of funds are regulated 
by this law. However, the author finds that the requirements for fee 
structure are somehow absent. In the Enterprise Annuity Fund 
Management Trial Measure (2004), advisory fee, administrative fees, 
front-end fees etc. are described and the highest level of advisory fee 
ratio for pension funds is fixed to 1.2%. The loose regulation for 
advisory fees may imply the government attitude towards mutual fund 
managers. The government may want to inspire the career as an 
investment advisor. This is reasonable because the qualification of 
advisors as a whole will be improved as better reward will attract more 
professionals. 
4.3.3 Immature capital market 
A mature capital market must have plenty of investment objectives 
and hedge tools. The lack of sufficient financial products limited the 
realization of professional investment skills.  
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According to the Security Investment Funds Operation Measure 
(2004), the area of mutual fund investment in China is constrained in 
listed stocks on Shanghai Stock Exchange (SHSE) and Shenzhen Stock 
Exchange (SZSE), and treasury bonds. If the interest rate changes, the 
movements of stocks and Treasury bond rates will be in the same 
direction. They can not hedge against each other. Moreover, the 
correlation between SHSE and SZSE is very high. They are normally 
raising and falling together (Liu, 2001). It is difficult to diversify risks 
relying on containing stocks from different stock markets. In addition 
to these, futures, options and other financial derivatives are rare in 
China. Using derivatives to lock the risks or constituted a fixed profit 
portfolio is not available. Finally, the overall quality of listed stocks is 
not high (ibid). The numbered good stocks provide a relatively narrow 
selection scope for mutual fund managers. At the same time, systematic 
risk can not be diversified by the mutual fund portfolios. 
 
4.3.4 Small size mutual funds 
  According to Gao (2006), the total asset of mutual funds in the U.S. 
is 300 times more than that of China. The small size of mutual funds in 
China limits the ability of investment advisors in their operation, 
because the stock selection and market timing is limited by the sum of 
money they have (Liu, et al., 2001). If the asset value is not enough to 
efficiently diversify and adjust the investment portfolio, the 
performance of mutual funds will be affected. 
 
  On the other hand, the fees level is high because of the small size of 
mutual funds in China. The reason why funds in the U.S. have lower 
fees level than elsewhere in the world lies in the “economies of scale”. 
If a fund has a considerable asset scale, the fees would be sufficient to 
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compensate expenses of operation and administration even if the ratio 
is small. Quite the opposite, if a fund has to pay for a certain amount 
under a small asset value, it has to charge a higher ratio. Nowadays, the 
assets of American mutual funds, $8.1 trillion, constitute 51% of the 
total asset value in the world, while the number of funds is only 15% of 
the world (Gao, 2006). In comparison, although Europe has over half 
of mutual funds in the world, the assets of $5.5 trillion only represent 
35% of the total value (ibid.). It is noticeable that economies of scale 
make them different. The size of mutual funds in China is much 
smaller than in the U.S. and Europe, so their fee ratios being much 
higher.  
4.3.5 Nonexistence of price competition 
  Fund advisors’ refusal to compete with each other for advisory 
business has been the norm for many years (Freeman and Brown, 
2001). Fund managers compete aggressively for new sales, but 
principally in ways designed to shelter high fee levels from price 
cutting pressure. When answering the situation of price competition in 
China, Mr. Wang2, a Chinese mutual fund manager, said that the “price 
war were not going to be triggered” in the near future.  
 
  The nonexistence of price competition in the mutual fund industry 
keeps the advisory fee overcharged through these years in China. This 
is the same as what is happening in the U.S. mutual fund industry 
(Freeman, 2007). 
 
 
 
                                                        
2 Wang Lixin, Manager of China Southern Fund Management Co. Ltd. 
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Chapter Five 
Conclusion 
 
  When people invest in mutual funds, they invest in the professional 
portfolio management skills. From the fast development of mutual 
funds, the faith in the advisors is always increasing. This is the same in 
all over the world, including China. The interest of mutual fund 
investors are the same as any shareholders of an organization in the 
marketplace: to get the highest return at the lowest cost.  
 
On one hand, mutual fund managers, or investment advisors, are 
assumed to be able to provide superior returns to investors. Instead of 
choosing a passive strategy, investors believe that advisors can use 
their professional skills to diversify the portfolio to reduce risk, to 
select the underpriced stock, and to trade the securities at a good 
market timing. These skills may help advisors to outperform the 
buy-and-hold investment. On the other hand, the investing advice 
services are not free. Together with other expense, advisory fees in 
mutual funds benefit from the economies of scale. This is one of the 
major advantages mutual funds compared with individual investment. 
Besides, the higher the return earn by mangers, the lower the advisory 
fee should be. Because the increase in net asset value offset the 
decrease in percentage of fee ratio, since the advisory expenses such as 
research expense, data maintaining and processing are relatively fixed. 
 
However, many researchers denied the ability of fund managers and 
give evidences to prove the market is efficient enough to eliminate 
anomalies returns. In addition, fees are found to be overcharged due to 
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conflicts of interest. Yet most of these results are found in the U.S. or 
U.K. and they are far from consensus. Whether they are the case in 
China as a emerging market is of little investigation. In order to study 
the three research questions: 1) Did mutual funds perform well enough 
to “beat the market?” 2) Or is there a premium pay for the conflict of 
interests between shareholders and managers in mutual fund industry? 
3) Are advisory fees reasonably matching their counterpart 
performance in mutual fund industry?, the Jensen’s alpha, economies 
of scale, and regressed relationship between return and advisory fee 
ratio are tested and analyzed in this paper. 
 
The findings can be concluded as: First, Jensen’s alpha for the China 
mutual fund industry is not significant and mutual funds in China as a 
whole do not outperform the market index; Second, advisory fees and 
other mutual fund expense do not share the benefit of economies of 
scale, where might be a premium for conflicts of interest; Third, 
advisory fee ratios are unrelated to performance, which indicates that 
even the good performance managers do not reduce the fee ratio and 
there is hardly any connection between return and cost. The reasons 
might be (1) the strong hand of Chinese government, (2) the loose law 
environment, (3) immature capital market, (4) small size, and (5) 
nonexistence of price competition. 
 
Although the evidences suggest that mutual fund industry in China is 
disappointed in performance and cost saving, the author believe there 
still reasons to invest in them. First, 60% mutual funds have positive 
alpha. Though the alphas are not significant, it is reasonable to say that 
most of mutual funds may not underperform the market. Second, 
although the effect of economies of scale is trivial, there is tendency of 
decline of fee ratios as the size grows. Based on the current growth in 
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the value of mutual funds as a whole, one can carefully forecasts that 
economies of scale will become clearer with the development of 
mutual fund industry in China. Third, the five reasons above also 
bother the individual investments. The buy-and-hold strategy may not 
outperform the active strategy as well, due to the market in China may 
follow EMH. 
 
During the process and analysis in this paper, there are some 
limitations. First, CAPM’s simple assumptions might affect the 
accuracy of results. Second, statistics for testing regression 
assumptions is not without fault. Third, due to the limited history of 
mutual fund industry, time horizon is two years which may not be long 
enough to eliminate the factor of luck. Last but not least, the use of 
average value but not basic points in economies of scale analysis may 
affect the precise of the result. Therefore, further research may address 
these limitations. For example, a variety of measurement and models, 
and longer time horizon in the later study will be helpful. 
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Appendix 1 
Information of Mutual Funds in the Sample 
 
Code Name 
NAV 
(Billion 
RMB) 
Advisory 
fee ratio 
% 
Administrative 
fee ratio % 
Two year 
rate of  
return % 
000001 Huaxia CZ 10.82 1.50 0.25 75.0547 
000011 HuaXia DP 3.98 1.50 0.25 394.8367 
002001 Huaxia HB 3.75 1.50 0.25 53.8302 
002011 Huaxia HL 9.10 1.50 0.25 106.4000 
20001 Guotai JY 1.04 1.50 0.25 166.7686 
20003 Guotai JL 0.26 1.50 0.25 162.8364 
20005 Guotai JM 1.1 1.50 0.25 281.9369 
040002 Huaan MSCI 2.66 1.00 0.20 293.2285 
050001 Boshi JZ 4.06 1.50 0.25 44.7071 
050002 Boshi YF 21.84 0.98 0.20 26.5255 
050004 Boshi JX 16.05 1.50 0.25 55.2026 
070006 Jiashi FW 8.96 1.50 0.25 276.7001 
080001 
Changsheng 
CS 
0.56 1.50 0.25 57.2012 
090001 Dacheng JZ 3.46 1.50 0.25 50.2717 
090003 Dacheng LC 1.02 1.50 0.25 142.1842 
090004 Dacheng JX 7.70 1.50 0.25 56.6701 
100020 Fuguo TY 6.37 1.50 0.25 128.5621 
100022 Fuguo TR 2 1.50 0.25 90.0735 
110002 Yifangda CL 9.08 1.50 0.25 274.4297 
110003 Yifangda 50 3.42 1.20 0.20 48.8754 
110005 Yifangda JJ 18.39 1.50 0.25 31.2798 
160105 Nanfang JP 7.35 1.50 0.25 65.6580 
160505 Boshi ZT 6.96 1.50 0.25 121.1116 
160605 Penghua 50 8.16 1.50 0.25 75.8470 
161604 Rongtong SZ 13.05 1.00 0.20 116.7370 
161606 Rongtong 0.56 1.50 0.25 63.2075 
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HY 
161607 
Rong tong 
JC 
3.54 1.30 0.20 40.6379 
162201 Taihe CZ 1.23 1.50 0.25 69.4072 
162202 Taihe ZQ 1.06 1.50 0.25 55.9611 
162203 Taihe WD 1.11 1.50 0.25 32.7893 
162204 Taihe HY 3.66 1.50 0.25 310.9818 
162605 Jingshun CC 12.88 1.50 0.25 22.0793 
162703 Guangfa XP 7.55 1.50 0.25 152.0857 
180003 Yinhua 88 8.03 1.20 0.25 4.7288 
200002 Greatwall JT 1.84 0.98 0.20 354.8586 
202001 Nanfang WJ 19.03 1.50 0.25 30.4502 
206001 Penghua HY 0.92 1.50 0.25 259.3461 
206102 Penghua PT 0.68 1.50 0.20 57.9651 
213002 Baoying YH 3.1 1.50 0.25 -1.9200 
240005 Huace ZZ 1.8 1.50 0.25 257.3333 
260101 Jingshun YX 7.72 1.50 0.25 20.8000 
260104 Jingshun NX 6.31 1.50 0.25 257.9534 
270001 Guangfa JF 6.2 1.50 0.25 91.3514 
290002 Taixin XX 1.87 1.50 0.25 119.0448 
350002 Tianzhi PZ 0.09 1.50 0.25 178.3416 
360001 Guangda BD 5.46 1.50 0.25 37.3827 
375010 Shangtou M 10.55 1.50 0.25 313.6767 
398001 Zhonghai YZ 0.93 1.50 0.25 98.6639 
400001 Dongfang L 1.69 1.50 0.25 44.1358 
410001 Huafu JZ 6 1.50 0.25 11.7985 
460001 Youhua C 1.22 1.50 0.25 79.8452 
510081 
Changsheng 
DT 
3.02 1.50 0.20 25.9785 
519180 Wanjia 180 0.45 1.00 0.20 136.9665 
519996 Changxin JX 0.62 1.50 0.25 61.8032 
580001 Dongwu YS 3.33 1.50 0.25 43.0065 
 
 86
Appendix 2  
Augmented Dickey-Fuller (ADF) Test 
 
Code ADF 
τ - Statistic Code 
ADF 
τ - Statistic 
SHSE-SZSE300 -3.485101 162201 -3.646008 
000001 -4.016084 162202 -3.938591 
000011 -3.041123 162203 -3.617137 
002001 -6.009649 162204 -4.817779 
002011 -3.956437 162605 -4.499625 
20001 -5.524011 162703 -3.459779 
20003 -3.917345 180003 -5.698705 
20005 -3.164732 200002 -3.554830 
040002 -3.685075 202001 -4.446286 
050001 -3.953422 206001 -3.181942 
050002 -7.213212 206102 -4.132774 
050004 -3.953785 213002 -4.833862 
070006 -3.888166 240005 -3.215245 
080001 -4.359863 260101 -4.499625 
090001 -3.957425 260104 -4.313623 
090003 -3.617575 270001 -3.905445 
090004 -4.118657 290002 -3.274787 
100020 -3.325482 350002 -3.602732 
100022 -3.926656 360001 -8.375958 
110002 -4.102557 375010 -3.634668 
110003 -6.677849 398001 -3.423448 
110005 -4.632803 400001 -4.306122 
160105 -3.767664 410001 -5.301627 
160505 -3.586749 460001 -3.696085 
160605 -4.302667 510081 -3.620780 
161604 -4.547350 519180 -4.138333 
161606 -4.569036 519996 -4.546310 
161607 -4.816859 580001 -3.839040 
Two year rate of 
return of each 
mutual funds 
-4.797413  
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Appendix 3 
Jensen’s Alpha 
 
Code R-Square α P-Value β P-Value DW 
000001 0.114 -0.001 0.975 0.337 0.107 2.07 
000011 0.747 0.009 0.463 0.864 0.000 1.428 
002001 0.404 -0.019 0.240 0.636 0.001 1.28 
002011 0.131 0.006 0.823 0.362 0.082 1.26 
20001 0.430 -0.002 0.920 0.656 0.001 1.11 
20003 0.304 0.004 0.837 0.551 0.005 2.053 
20005 0.760 0.008 0.434 0.872 0.000 1.452 
040002 0.980 -0.001 0.648 0.990 0.000 2.135 
050001 0.091 -0.005 0.896 0.302 0.152 2.155 
050002 0.062 -0.005 0.888 0.250 0.239 1.554 
050004 0.041 0.007 0.835 0.202 0.343 2.111 
070006 0.867 0.002 0.739 0.931 0.000 1.338 
080001 0.112 -0.004 0.883 0.335 0.110 1.996 
090001 0.040 0.006 0.856 0.200 0.348 2.124 
090003 0.211 0.007 0.733 0.459 0.024 1.541 
090004 0.059 0.002 0.947 0.243 0.253 2.494 
100020 0.498 -0.028 0.267 0.706 0.000 2.05 
100022 0.068 0.010 0.721 0.262 0.217 2.054 
110002 0.827 -0.003 0.792 0.910 0.000 1.439 
110003 0.163 -0.017 0.640 0.404 0.050 2.179 
110005 0.168 -0.022 0.566 0.410 0.047 2.031 
160105 0.047 0.008 0.783 0.217 0.309 2.059 
160505 0.049 0.020 0.505 0.220 0.300 2.189 
160605 0.070 0.006 0.871 0.265 0.211 2.186 
161604 0.263 6.3E-05 0.997 0.513 0.010 2.233 
161606 0.150 -0.010 0.773 0.388 0.061 2.131 
161607 0.560 -0.027 0.045 0.749 0.000 1.882 
162201 0.026 0.014 0.610 0.160 0.455 1.947 
162202 0.025 0.013 0.727 0.157 0.463 2.102 
162203 0.034 0.002 0.944 0.184 0.390 1.991 
162204 0.666 0.007 0.626 0.816 0.000 1.926 
162605 0.166 -0.027 0.456 0.408 0.048 1.83 
162703 0.078 0.020 0.490 0.279 0.187 2.087 
180003 0.312 -0.048 0.118 0.559 0.005 2.186 
200002 0.975 0.007 0.039 0.988 0.000 1.818 
202001 0.021 0.006 0.870 0.143 0.504 2.353 
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206001 0.718 0.017 0.054 0.870 0.000 1.701 
206102 0.071 0.001 0.961 0.266 0.209 1.857 
213002 0.092 -0.030 0.388 0.362 0.082 1.898 
240005 0.706 0.011 0.257 0.840 0.000 1.814 
260101 0.166 -0.027 0.456 0.408 0.048 1.83 
260104 0.405 0.016 0.322 0.636 0.001 1.371 
270001 0.145 0.002 0.921 0.381 0.066 1.767 
290002 0.118 0.008 0.766 0.343 0.100 1.967 
350002 0.622 0.008 0.417 0.789 0.000 2.415 
360001 0.078 -0.004 0.915 0.279 0.187 2.179 
375010 0.658 0.003 0.848 0.811 0.000 1.715 
398001 0.093 0.008 0.752 0.305 0.147 2.172 
400001 0.171 -0.016 0.552 0.414 0.044 2.267 
410001 0.140 -0.025 0.449 0.374 0.072 1.342 
460001 0.180 -0.003 0.899 0.424 0.039 2.358 
510081 0.003 0.011 0.742 0.052 0.811 2.185 
519180 0.252 0.001 0.980 0.502 0.012 2.214 
519996 0.323 -0.030 0.308 0.569 0.004 2.181 
580001 0.011 0.010 0.637 0.107 0.619 2.43 
Average  -0.00171    1.935 
 
 
 
 
